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Abstract

US airpower theory and doctrine depend on the concept that the destruction of a
few key targets or centers of gravity can unravel the enemy's physical ability to wage war
or break his will to prosecute the war. This synergistic decimation of the enemy's
effectiveness and resistance to our political will is known as Strategic Effects. These
strategic effects are very difficult to quantify and are not directly accounted for in current
DoD computer models. Since these computer models are used to aid with decisions
about force structure and budget priorities, many believe that the Air Force's greatest
potential contribution to modern joint warfare is going unrecognized and under financed.
This thesis explores military theory and current doctrine to define a method
quantifying strategic effects. This method is based upon the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act
(OODA) decision cycle. Next, current modeling techniques, and specifically the
campaign level model, THUNDER, are examined for applicability to model strategic
effects as defined. Finally, a proof of concept model is developed to study the advantage
associated with OODA loop exploitation. This simple model uses Java-based, multithreaded, autonomous, complex adaptive agents to demonstrate the non-linear
(synergistic) results of OODA loop exploitation. These results are similar to the
anticipated effects of strategic attack and provide a solid foothold from which the study
and modeling of strategic effects can begin.

Xll

Strategie Effects of Airpower and Complex Adaptive Agents:
An Initial Investigation

CHAPTER 1

Airpower proponents advocate the decisive combat potential of modern airpower.
Air Force leadership does not believe current models and simulations capture the true
capabilities of modern airpower [SEAW notes]. This deficiency may put the Air Force in
a disadvantageous position in joint force structuring, weapons system procurement and
force employment decisions. The capability in question is known doctrinally as strategic
effects. The strategic effect from the application of airpower has been intuitive to
airpower advocates since air doctrine and theory was initially proposed by the likes of
Douhet. However, this same intuitive effect has been nearly impossible to predict and is
not directly accounted for in any mathematical models or simulations currently being
used by the US Air Force. "Failure to properly analyze the mechanism that ties tactical
results to strategic effects has historically been a failing of both airpower theorists and
strategists."[AFDD 2-1, p3.]
In April of 1998, an Air Force wide workshop was held to examine the modeling
of strategic effects. The Air Force leadership's concerns were summed up in the 6 March
1998 message announcing the event:

Workshop objectives are to provide actionable inputs to the modeling and
simulation communities to support improved representation of airpower
contributions in the current developmental suite of models... Current
models and simulations do not adequately represent airpower
contributions to joint warfighting capabilities beyond the tactical level.
This situation is evidenced in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) and the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS).
This conference brought together those involved in the airpower theory debate and many
simulation and modeling experts from the Air Force and DoD. Several new ideas were
discussed, but the Air Force has not taken a position on the modeling of strategic effects
of airpower.
This thesis attacks this problem in three ways. First, it defines strategic effects in
a focused fashion amenable to modeling. Next, it examines the capabilities of the Air
Force's current premier campaign-level model, THUNDER, to determine if it does or can
model strategic effects. Finally, the thesis suggests a complexity-based autonomousagent methodology for modeling strategic airpower effects. An experiment is performed
using an initial model to test the concept of autonomous agents for modeling strategic
effects.
This thesis is organized so that Chapter 2 is a stand-alone article suitable for
submission to an academic journal. Chapter 3 outlines future extensions to this work.
The appendices contain further details on the development of this methodology for
modeling strategic effects. Specifically, Appendix A contains sample model output and
calculations. Appendix B contains more doctrine framed in the perspective of OODA
exploitation. Appendix C, is the documentation and source code for the model.

CHAPTER 2

2.1. Introduction, Overview, And Contributions
2.1.1. Introduction
Airpower is easy to speculate about, but often difficult to quantify. In World War
II, airpower was massed in unparalleled magnitude against civilian-industrial and military
targets with results that are still being studied. Airpower was used in the Vietnam War on
targets of all descriptions with dubious results. These historical examples remind us that
the nature of a war and the most appropriate application of airpower in that war are not
always obvious.
The early airpower theorists and advocates, like Douhet and Mitchell, speculated
about aerial weapons of mass destruction aimed at the enemy nation instead of the
enemy's military forces. To these theorists airpower could be a decisive element in the
application of military force. Attacking the nation instead of its armed forces could allow
political objectives to be met while avoiding the horrific military confrontations typical of
WWI. The concept of attacking an enemy's capability without having to engage its
armed forces is now referred to as strategic attack. The massive conventional raids of
WWII were strategic attacks, but it was the advent of atomic weapons that demonstrated
the true strategic capability of airpower. These revolutionary weapons helped bring a
hasty end to World War II. Despite the subsequent absence of their use, the deterrent

capabilities of nuclear weapons played an important role during the Cold War, yet are
ineffective against the lesser adversaries of primary concern to US interests.
The world television audience witnessed the capabilities of modern precisionbased airpower in Desert Storm. Despite the acute documentation of damage and the
final results of that war, the exact influence of airpower on our military victory is still
debated. Some claim that precision airdropped conventional munitions now have the
strategic knockout capability of nuclear weapons without their political ramifications. In
essence precision weaponry realized the strategic attack potential of airpower envisioned
by Mitchell across the spectrum of conflict. Others claim that the premise behind
strategic attack is flawed. This second group believes there is little or no historical
evidence of the hypothesized catastrophic effects of strategic attack and these effects are
neither predictable nor reliable. This would make strategic attack an ineffective use of
airpower. These critics claim the most appropriate application of modern airpower, with
its increased lethality, is to directly attack the enemy's fielded forces.
The place where these theoretical debates have become increasingly important is
in the DoD budget. An aircraft optimized for strategic attack (B-2) does not usually have
the same characteristics as an aircraft optimized for battlefield attack (A-10). It is often
difficult to rationalize and justify the expense of developing and acquiring more than one
new weapon system with modern austere defense budgets. The question arises then of
which strategy and which aircraft is best suited to the airpower roles, missions, and
doctrine. Computer models and simulations influence the decisions on force structure
and weapons procurement issues like these. Curiously, these computer models do not

sufficiently demonstrate the strategic effects that our airpower theory predicts and
doctrine expects.
The analysts and computer model caretakers do not necessarily refute the idea of
strategic effects. The exact reason that one enemy chooses to continue to fight to the
death while others sue for peace before the fight even begins is unclear. The subtle
complexities of (enemy) social and political behavior are difficult to model
mathematically, especially with enough certainty to program into a combat model. The
targets and the level of destruction needed to produce these effects are also hard to
quantify. There are currently too many uncertainties about strategic effects and their
causes to validate and verify them and put them into a working model.
Computer model deficiencies not withstanding, modern strategic airpower
advocates are confident that if the correct targets are chosen, the enemy will lose their
will or ability to fight and accept our political alternatives. However, these advocates
worry that computer-based mathematical models used to decide national military
direction fail to capture the complex indirect military, social and political effects strategic
attack are supposed bring to the fight. The major concern is that the Air Force's
contribution to the US arsenal, which is arguably the most effective method of militarypolitical force currently available in joint warfare, is understated and inadequately
financed.
2.1.2. Overview of Research
This research contains four main thrusts. The first is defining strategic effects in a
way that they can be observed, recognized and modeled. Primary sources for this area are

USAF doctrine and the military theories of Clausewitz [Clausewitz], Warden [Warden],
Pape [Pape], Boyd [Fadok, McDonald], and Watts [Watts] as well as the modeling ideas
of Ilichinski [Ilachinski], Zimm [Zimm], and Davis [Davis, Davis and Blumenthal]. The
second examines THUNDER, and its capabilities and shortcomings for modeling
strategic effects. Next, mathematical chaos and complexity theory, complex adaptive
systems and autonomous agents are examined. These methods seem well suited for
modeling strategic effects. Finally, a prototype complex adaptive agent simulation of
strategic effects is built and used in an exploratory modeling fashion.

2.2. Defining Strategic Effects
The recently revised Air Force doctrine documents help clarify the meaning of
strategic effects of airpower. This doctrine draws upon the theories of Clausewitz,
Warden, Pape, and Boyd as next described.
2.2.1. US Air Force Doctrine
Three AF doctrine documents are important to the study of strategic effects. They
are AFDD 1, Basic Doctrine; AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare; and AFDD 2-1.2, Strategic Attack.
AFDD 1 contains three "enduring truths" that describe the fundamental nature of
war [AFDD 1, p. 6]. Each truth suggests a strategic effects approach to combat. The first
truth is that, "War is an instrument of national policy." "Victory in war is not measured
by casualties inflicted, battles won or lost, or territory occupied, but by whether or not
political objectives were achieved" [AFDD 1, p. 6]. The second fundamental is, "War is
a complex and chaotic human endeavor." "Human frailty and irrationality shape war's

nature. Uncertainty and unpredictability—what many call the 'fog' of war—combine
with danger, physical stress, and human fallibility to produce 'friction,' a phenomenon
that makes apparently simple operations unexpectedly, and sometimes even
insurmountably, difficult" [AFDD 1, p. 6]. While there is no way to eliminate uncertainty
or unpredictability, "...sound doctrine, leadership, organization, core personal values,
technologies, and training can lessen their effects" [AFDD 1, p. 6]. The last fundamental
truth is that "War is a clash of opposing wills." "War is not waged against an inanimate
or static object, but against a living, calculating and highly unpredictable enemy" [AFDD
1, p. 6]. This result is a dynamic combination of action and reaction. While physical
factors are crucial in war, the national will and the leadership's will are also critical
components of war. The will to prosecute the war or the will to resist the enemy can be
decisive elements.
The search for strategic effects starts with a definition of strategy. Strategy
originates in policy and addresses broad objectives and the plans for achieving them.
Military strategy helps achieve national political objectives [AFDD 1, p. 4]. Draft AFDD
2-1 [p. 1] defines strategy as "...a means to accomplish an end." In the context of global
politics, the purpose or "end" of conflict is to bend an adversary's will to match our
political goals. Strategy is our set of preconceived plans of how to deal with what we
expect to encounter, using what we expect to have, to attain the objectives we expect that
we will want to attain. Any significant change in these expectations will require a new
plan. A strategic effect is anything that disrupts this strategy.

Strategie effect is the disruption of the enemy's strategy, ability, or will to
wage war or carry out aggressive activity through the destruction or
disruption of his center(s) of gravity or other vital target sets.. .Strategic
effects can also indirectly result from the actions of aerospace or surface
forces at the lower levels of war. [AFDD 2-1, p. 8]

Strategic attacks are, "...those operations intended to directly achieve strategic
effects by striking at the enemy's centers of gravity (COGs)" [AFDD 2-1, p. 45]. A
center of gravity is further defined as, "the characteristics, capabilities, or localities from
which a force derived its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight" [AFDD 1,
p. 51]. The point is also made that by attacking the COGs, we seek to avoid a direct,
extended (high attrition), military-on-military engagement. Strategic attack should
produce effects well beyond the direct physical damage of the attack. This synergistic
property is often conceptualized as a cascading collapse of the enemy from within or a
domino effect.
"Strategic attack is a function of objectives or effects achieved, not forces
employed" [AFDD 1, p. 52]. Note strategic attack is not necessarily nuclear or longrange. This point is emphasizes in AFDD 1 [p. 52.] since "...many strategic actions tend
to be nonnuclear conventional or special operations against more limited war or
contingency operations objectives, and will increasingly include attack on an adversary's
information and information systems." Command, control (C2) and communications
(C3) targets are typically on the top of strategic target lists since the enemy's strategic
plan is disrupted if instructions cannot be passed to those responsible for executing the
plan. In fact, ".. .the enemy's C2 should always be a target of particular focus in strategic
attack" [AFDD 1, p. 53].

Airpower strategic effects are not necessarily solely related to the air war. An
effect is strategic if it impacts the entire conflict and that impact may be more in the
political arena than on the battlefield. "The Berlin Airlift is a successful example of how
aerospace power can profoundly shape and control events without necessarily having to
resort to aerial attacks" [AFDD2-1.2, p. 3].
2.2.2. A Basis in Military Theory
Doctrine is based on military theory and lessons learned in combat. This section
examines some of the ideas of various prominent military thinkers whose ideas have
influenced the study and doctrine of strategic effects.
2.2.2.1. Clausewitz
Clausewitz [Clausewitz, p. 89] believed that the nature of war is not
".. .fundamentally constant with only minor adjustments for situational uniqueness." This
contrasts with most contemporary combat modeling approaches in which combat is
assumed to be controlled by rigid, constant rules. Instead Clausewitz views war as a
"paradoxical trinity" of violence, chance, and reason which must be balanced in any
effective theory on war [Clausewitz, p. 89]. Let's define each point of this trinity.
Violence can best be exemplified by the people of a country and their desire for or will to
support the war. Chance is often represented by the military and its commander whose
lethal skills or abilities must be used creatively to capitalize on the circumstances of the
battle at hand. Reason is commonly expressed as the government and the political limits
on operations or strategies that keep war from outrageous escalation. Reason is also
attributed to the individual combatants whose free will, fear, and morals must cooperate
for them to be effective in combat. Clausewitz [Clausewitz, p. 89] explains this as:

The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people;
the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of
probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander of
the army; but the political aims are the business of the government alone.

Clausewitz [Clausewitz, p. 90] defines three broad objectives in planning to target
the entire enemy system. These three objectives relate to his "paradoxical trinity" and are
the armed forces, the country, and the enemy's will. To be successful, the armed forces
must be destroyed (physically or morally) so that ".. .they can no longer carry on the
fight"[Clausewitz, p. 90]. It is important to understand that Clausewitz used the term
moral not to mean virtuous, but to mean psychological or emotional. Clausewitz's
definition is used throughout. Clausewitz states the enemy country must be occupied so
that new forces cannot be built. This is a physical victory over the government. But the
potential for reigniting the war exists "until the enemy's will has been broken: in other
words, so long as the enemy government and its allies have not been driven to ask for
peace, or the population made to submit" [Clausewitz, p. 90]. Breaking the will of the
government or the population would be a moral victory over the enemy nation.
Clausewitz also explained that war on paper (strategy) differs from real war due to
fog and friction [Clausewitz, p. 119]. These unpredictable and intangible concepts are
critical to defining strategic effects. Clausewitz does not believe in underlying physical
or mathematical laws of war and did not trust mathematical formulations of battle. Davis
and Blumenthal [Davis and Blumenthal, p. 22] concluded, based on Clausewitz's
writings, that models and calculations are not".. .irrelevant, but rather that to be useful,
models and modelers must include a wide range of qualitative factors and must also be
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humble with respect to random factors and horseshoe nails." This suggests that models
should become tools of exploration, not soothsaying answer machines.
2.2.2.2. Warden
Warden echoes the idea that the objective of war is not the defeat of the enemy's
armed forces, but the peace (in a politically changed world) that follows. It is better if
political objectives are met with limited or even no direct large-scale military conflict. As
with Clausewitz, a key concept in Warden's targeting plan is identifying an enemy's
COGs. These COGs are defined as ".. .the point where the enemy is most vulnerable and
the point where an attack will have the best chance of being decisive" [Warden (1998b),
p. 7]. Warden proposes a five-ring system as a general characterization of any enemy or
"strategic entity." Analyses using this model are a basis for strategic planning. The five
concentric rings of the model from the center (most important) outward are: Leadership,
Organic Essentials, Infrastructure, Population, and Fighting Mechanism (see Figure 1).
Elements of the enemy system are characterized into these rings from which further
analysis defines the enemy COGs. Once these COGs are identified they should be
attacked in parallel to disrupt the entire enemy system, or as Warden suggests, induce
"strategic paralysis." This parallel attack depletes enemy resources, capabilities and
alternatives faster than traditional serial attacks and is a key to successful strategic
campaign. Today's precision weapons and stealth aircraft are the enablers of parallel
attack.
Warden believes his five ring model may be employed to define strategic
objectives which, when achieved, either change the enemy leadership's will to align with
ours (coercive victory) or reduce the enemy's ability to physically resist our will through

11

our action (military-political victory). Warden emphasizes that strategic attack pressures
the leadership, not the fielded military.

Leadership
Organic Essentials
Infrastructure
Population
Fielded Military

Figure 1. Warden's five ring model of any strategic entity

2.2.2.3. Pape
Pape is not an advocate of strategic air attack. He describes bombing for strategic
purposes as coercion toward political goals and points out the difficulty in precisely
measuring these "squishy" multifaceted (multivariate) objectives. He splits coercive
airpower into three categories: decapitation, punishment, and denial [Pape, p. 97]. These
three categories are roughly equivalent to Clausewitz's three objectives.
Decapitation is Pape's interpretation of Warden's emphasis on leadership and C3
as a center of gravity. Decapitation, in Clausewitzian terms, is an attack on the trinity
elements of chance, violence, and reason. It is an attack on chance because it applies
stress to the military C3 system. It could be an attack on violence by showing force
against a prominent citizen. It could be an appeal to the element of reason, which may
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be lacking in the targeted leaders but alive in the nation. Pape concludes that
decapitation is not effective because of the political and physical difficulties of an attack
for assassination. Also, competent military and political staffs can carry on with the loss
of, or separation from, the leader(s). The redundancies of communication and
information systems in modern industrialized countries make physical isolation of
various elements of the command structure extremely difficult.
Pape concludes that punishment (of the enemy population) through the
destruction of the Warden rings of organic resources, infrastructure, and of the
population itself is also ineffective in altering the will of the nation unless a politically
unacceptable percentage of the enemy population is directly targeted and killed. A
punishment campaign does not inflict paralysis on the enemy military, but instead
punishes the non-combatants (violence) who are denied dwindling national resources.
Indigenous resourcefulness, which cannot be predicted or modeled, prevails to keep the
military supplied despite the conditions of the general population.
Pape's last division of coercive attack is denial of the resources that the combat
forces need to prosecute the war. This is the interdiction mission. Denial may be
effective, but the elasticity of modern economies of war, especially if fought by
alliances, can often overcome isolated or sporadic attacks on manufacturing, storage, and
distribution facilities. Denial also usually only works in long wars of attrition where the
enemy must rely on equipment manufactured during the conflict after stockpiled supplies
are exhausted. Pape recommends tactical bombing of theater level military targets as a
more effective alternative to a strategic air campaign.
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2.2.2.4. Bovd
Boyd believes that military operations are basically a sequence of decision processes or
cycles. These cycles have four main points: observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA).
These cycles have been dubbed "OODA loops" and are consistent with the contemporary
emphasis on situational awareness (SA). A smaller OODA loop is indicative of more SA
as the information about the situation is synthesized and acted upon more quickly. If you
can make your decision cycle shorter or "turn inside" the opponent's OODA loop, then
you can foil the enemy's thought process and always be a step ahead of him. Boyd's aim
for military operations was to first, ".. .create and perpetuate a highly fluid and menacing
state of affairs for the enemy, and then disrupt or incapacitate his ability to adapt to such
an environment" [Fadok, p. 15]. Key to this idea is adaptability, which is described as
using friction to shape the conflict in your favor.
Boyd shares Clausewitz's view of the moral aspect of combat, noting that
".. .while considerations of time, space, and speed had an important impact on
success and failure, the moral and psychological dimensions played a dominant
role" [McDonald, p. 147]. Being "inside the OODA loop" generates the most
important principal of war: surprise. Exploiting the OODA loop can cause two
different kinds of surprise [McDonald, p. 149]. Moral surprise is being unaware
of the attack or its location. Material surprise is knowing that the attack is
coming, but being too logistically or physically unprepared to do anything about
it.
Boyd believes that consistently operating inside your opponent's OODA
loop will generate fear and anxiety (moral friction) and eventually destroy the
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opponent's will to fight. McDonald [McDonald, p. 149] notes, "In this sense,
operating inside the enemy's decision cycle has cumulative effects that surpass the
linear impact of simple destruction of forces."
2.2.2.5. Asymmetric Force Strategy
The Air Force Doctrine Center's (AFDC) new concept of operation for the U.S.
armed forces is called the Asymmetric Force Strategy [AFDD 2-1, p. 3]. This new
approach to war is described as "US military forces now leverage sophisticated military
capabilities to achieve national objectives and avoid bloody force-on-force engagements
that characterized America's traditional strategy of attrition and annihilation" [AFDD 2-1,
p. 3]. This is the classic concept of strategic effects. AFDD 2-1 [p. 8] lists two ways to
achieve strategic effects; by direct strategic attack or by the cumulative indirect effects of
non-strategic attacks. The strategic attack function "...is often aimed directly at producing
the strategic effect of enemy defeat, with no intermediate level effects on enemy forces
involved" [AFDD 2-1, p. 7]. This is the approach taken by Warden. Non-strategic
attacks can attrit the enemy forces and resources to make him militarily ineffective. This
is more in line with Pape's ideas.
USAF doctrine incorporates strategic effects in Asymmetric Force Strategy.
Thus, we need models that quantify, measure, and study strategic effects in a way that
logically ties back in to real world experience.

2.3. A Concept to Model
The moral elements of warfare are without a doubt a key to capturing strategic
effects. They include fear, surprise, and will. These moral effects synergistically interact
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when the physical attack diverges drastically in speed, intensity, or effectiveness from
expectations. These elements are certainly manifested in many ways, but can be
described in terms of their effect on the decision making of combatants at all levels of
conflict.
2.3.1. The Moral Elements
Fear is anxiety about possible or expected unpleasant events in the uncertain
future. An individual's reaction to fear shapes their decisions and corresponding actions.
Surprise presents its victim with unfulfilled expectations or unforeseen occurrences.
Surprise often results from incomplete or poor planning on the part of its victim. Surprise
may be inevitable to the victim if planning information is inadequate. Will is
determination expressed as a deliberate act of pursuing a course of action. Except for
cases of martyrdom, will is bounded by an element of realism about the expected, though
often optimistic, outcome of the situation to which it is applied. If the desired objective is
clearly unattainable and the cost of failure is high, will may be broken and the course of
action abandoned.
The moral elements comprising our definition of strategic effects address the
ability to anticipate, correctly prepare for, and influence future events. Boyd's OODA
loop construct offers a template for modeling these aspects of combat.
2.3.2. Bovd's OODA Loop
The OODA loop is recognized in Joint Publication 3-13.1 [Appendix A] as a
decision model ".. .applicable to all C2 systems - friendly or adversary." The OODA
loop is also analogous to the Shewhart cycle and Ishikawa circle, which are generalpurpose process improvement cycles taught in many "Quality improvement" techniques,
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including the QAF initiative [Air Force Process Improvement Guide, p. 1]. Any entity
that makes systematic decisions has an OODA cycle.
Any OODA loop takes a measurable amount of time to complete, and this time
may vary between OODA loop cycles. The OODA loop model is represented graphically
as a circular connection of the four phases of the decision cycle (see Figure 2). A
common misconception to get from this image is that the OODA loop is a single series of
sequential events. Instead JP 3-1.3 describes the OODA process as continuous, meaning
an entity simultaneously has multiple concurrent OODA processes. Rather than a series
of OODA loops, conceptually we can think of a cable of OODA strands.

DECISION CYCLE
OBSERVATION

Figure 2. OODA loop as shown in JP3-13.1
2.3.3. The OODA Cable

Envision the "OODA cable" as four separate pieces of cable spliced together at
the OODA phases or nodes to form a loop (see Figure 3). Decisions flow through this
cable like charges of electrical current with many in the cable at one time. The piece of
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cable going into the observe node is the thickest (most strands) with some loose or frayed
ends on the end away from the observe node. Each strand represents a data delivery
device or sensor available to the entity. The frayed ends represent sources of external
information while the unbroken strands are internal feedback. Not all incoming
information is relevant to the decision at hand, nor can all the information be processed,
thus at the observation node the cable is spliced into a thinner cable with a strand
representing all relevant inputs. The cable thickness of this section represents the
information capacity of the decision-making entity. Information overload occurs when
more information is presented to the entity that it can include in the decision process. At
the orient node all the strands of information are spliced into a thinner (fewer strands)

Figure 3. The OODA cable

cable with a strand for each plausible course of action. The number of strands in this
section of the cable represents the number of options of the entity can evaluate before a
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decision must be reached. This section of cable is spliced into a smaller section at the
decide node. The strands leaving the decide node represent the actions the individual has
decided to take. This cable is spliced into a smaller cable at the act node in which there is
a strand for each act the entity can do simultaneously. These "act" strands lead directly
into the observe node as feedback from the action taken to be processed with new
external information from the loose or frayed strands.
In short, the OODA cable represents the inherent need to filter and consolidate
information through the decision cycle with thicker cables representing an increased
ability to carry information.
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Figure 4. Beene's OODA interaction concept

2.3.4. A System of OODA Loops
In a complex system, OODA loops form a hierarchical interconnected system (see
Figure 4). OODA loops at one level in this hierarchical system may depend upon OODA
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loops at the same or other levels for information (observations), instructions (orientation),
or to carry out decisions (actions) [Beene, 1998]. OODA loops in a system can also be
laterally dependent on adjacent "peer" loops.
OODA loop cycles at any level may differ in length from those at other levels.
For example, a commander issues orders in the act phase. These orders feed into the
orient phase of the subordinate. The outcome of the actions of the subordinate affect the
commander's observe phase. The C3I challenge is to coordinate these OODA loops.
"Though time frames vary at each echelon of command - according to the mission and
battlefield perspective - decision cycles must be sufficiently synchronized to exploit both
sequential and cumulative opportunity" [McDonald, p. 151].

Figure 5. Stable OODA web

From an attack perspective, if the right OODA loops are exploited and made to
collapse, the entire enemy system could become unstable and cascade into failure. This is
one classically anticipated result of a successful strategic attack, and is Warden's vision
of strategic paralysis.
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From a decision making, or OODA perspective, envision the enemy system as a
hierarchical web of dependent OODA links with irregular but successively smaller links
towards the bottom. Each link is an OODA cable. The links of OODA cable are not
uniform. Some links have many other links dependent on or connected to them. Others
are dangling relatively free from adjacent links. The cables at the top are typically longer
and thicker as commanders with their staffs are able to process a lot of information, but
have relatively long decision cycles (a day or two). These larger links have many smaller
COG>

Figure 6. OODA web with identifiable COGs.

subordinate links attached to them as the lower echelons rely on command decisions and
command staff relies on indirect information or feedback. Subsequent rows in the web
are shorter, thinner cables fastened at the orient node to the commander's act node. The
bottom row in the web is made of short, thin cables representing the individual
combatant. These individuals have only a small amount of information to process, but
need a decision every few seconds. If a bottom link is broken, the web is tattered and less
effective. If an upper link is broken, the web may falter leaving the enemy exposed. If
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enough links are broken, the web becomes ineffective. A link of any size that has a large
number of dependent, attached links is a center of gravity.
2.3.5. OODA Exploitation
Boyd suggests "turning inside" the enemy decision process, or beating the enemy
with faster, superior decisions and correspondingly devastating actions. This requires a
shorter, faster OODA loop than the enemy's. This will add moral (mental) fog and
friction to the enemy's situation. Warden's theory is similar [Fadok, p. 37], although he
advocates making the enemy's OODA loop larger and slower by adding physical friction
and fog through the destruction of key COGs, such as C3I. Further, continued attack
prevents recovery or repair of the enemy's OODA web.
Pape uses historical examples to refute the strategic effects of bombing. For
instance, the U.S. strategic bombing campaign in Europe during WWII did not
sufficiently disrupt Germany's industrial capacity. The sequential versus parallel
bombing campaign allowed Germany to reorganize, regroup and rebuild between attacks.
In short, Germany repaired their OODA web before further US attacks could collapse it.
This is why Warden advocates parallel attack. Hit the system at all levels
simultaneously and continuously and the system has neither the time nor the ability to
recover. Stretch the links until enough of those links break preventing enemy recovery.
Nuclear attack would (and did) halt the OODA process (cut the cables) on most levels
simultaneously, giving a parallel attack with just one weapon. This explains why Pape
calls a "king's X" on denouncing strategic effects of nuclear weapons.
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Disrupting an enemy's OODA requires striking the proper COGs. Identifying
OODA processes that are vulnerable COGs can be a difficult task. Clausewitz's
"paradoxical trinity" of violence, chance, and reason, represent a valid starting point.
2.3.5.1. The Clausewitzian Trinity Revisited
Clausewitz's three elements are often misrepresented as military, population, and
government instead of chance, violence, and reason. Clausewitz gives the former three as
examples of the latter three, not substitutes. One reason for this substitution is that the
trinity example at the national level is easier with which to identify than the underlying
concepts. The trinity the Air Force Doctrine Center's proposes for the study of strategic
effects [AFDC, p. 6] is shown compared to Clausewitz's trinity (see Figure 7). The

Chance

Reason

Clausewitz's original trinity

AFDC's proposed trinity

Figure 7. The Clausewitz trinity compared to the AFDC's interpretation

specific national level example of the trinity cannot be used as a replacement for the
general concept. All three original elements are actually likely to be found in each level
of the enemy system. Less specific examples of the trinity elements are given below.
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The element of chance attempts to quantify the ability to take advantage of
unexpected opportunities. It can be thought of as initiative. In the national example, the
military is the only group that realistically is in a position to find opportunities against the
enemy. Opportunities for initiative happen frequently at every level and in every aspect
of the national system. International political alliances, increasing industrial production,
and 'victory gardens' are all examples of chances to gain an advantage over the enemy.
These chances just have to be seen to be acted upon. Chance can be interpreted as a
function of the ability to observe a potential course of action.
Violence is the perspective from which events are seen. A population with
violence will tend to attribute negative events to the enemy, strengthening its resolve or
will against that enemy. A population with less violence may search for other alternative
causes to the event before blaming the enemy. If a reasonable alternative can be found,
the less violent population may not be inflamed to the point of supporting war. Violence
frames the event in context of the conflict for decision-making entities. Violence orients
observations toward a decision. This violence-based orientation can be found to some
degree at every level of decision making in the enemy system. Reason is the element that
keeps the war from escalating to the horrific level of 'total war'. The government takes
this function at the national level because it usually makes the decision as to whether or
not the country should attack, or conversely, should surrender. The government is also
the body that will face any political repercussions for war crimes. Reason is applied at
every level in the enemy system on decisions concerning the conflict. Individual soldiers
must decide whether or not to shoot enemy combatants and enemy non-combatants. The
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nation must decide whether or not to support military conscription and how young those
conscripts may be. Reason impacts the decide phase of decision cycles at every level
2.3.5.2. The Trinity and OODA Connection
If chance is a function of the ability to observe, violence helps orients
observations, and reason is an element of the decision process, then Clausewitz's trinity
can be viewed as factors that directly effect an OODA cycle. These three elements are
essential for the action of waging war. Clausewitz has given the formulation for an
OODA loop and an example that shows target classes for exploiting a national level
OODA. Figure 8 describes this alternative interpretation of the Clausewitz trinity. This
interpretation maps the three elements of the trinity to the three initial phases of the
decision process, instead of to components of the national system. This interpretation
will serve as a theoretical basis for targeting the OODA loop to achieve strategic effects.

Violence
ORIENT

ACT

\

DECIDE
Reason

OBSERVE *"
Chance

Figure 8. The Clausewitz trinity from the OODA perspective
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2.3.5.3. Targeting the Trinity
Attacking Clausewitz's "chance" is striking the enemy nation's ability to wage an
effective war by nullifying its preparations or strategy. This reduces the nation's ability to
take the initiative if an opportunity is observed. The focus on rebuilding strategy after an
initial strike can also put the enemy on 'the defensive' and blind them to immediate,
tactical opportunities. Chance can be attacked by either foiling its military plans or
directly diminishing its forces' abilities. The latter was the U.S. approach with the
massive raids on German war industry in World War H
Targeting Clausewitz's "violence" is targeting the enemy nation's will to fight.
This is probably the most difficult component to prove existence, let alone target. Neither
Germany's bombing of London nor Britain's bombing of Germany changed either
nation's attitude or will to fight in WWE. In fact public resolve against the aggressor
likely increased in each instance. On the other hand, swarms of Iraqi infantry surrendered
to unarmed corespondents near the end of Desert Storm. "Violence" targets are entities
with limited commitment to the political objectives. Propaganda and PSYOP may be the
most useful weapon here.
Reason is a realization of the costs associated with war. A strategic attack that
demonstrates the price a nation will have to pay is an attack on reason. Consider the El
Dorado Canyon Raid in 1986 that targeted Libyan leader Kadafi. The attack
demonstrated that the US was indeed willing to prosecute a war that would be costly to
Libya and Kadafi. This attack was outside the bounds of Kadafi's expectations. It raised
the cost of the Libyan course of action and apparently impacted Kadafi's will to pursue his
policies.
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2.3.7. Airpower and OODA Exploitation
Airpower is the force of choice for OODA exploitation. "Because of its speed,
range, flexibility, and ability to maneuver as required to locate and precisely attack targets
while neutralizing or avoiding threats, aerospace power is uniquely suited to conducting
rapid, parallel attacks against the enemy" [AFDD 2-1, p. 5]. These characteristics of
airpower allow simultaneous and continuous attacks on an enemy OODA system,
preventing recovery. "A key difference between aerospace power and surface warfare is
that aerospace forces can often strike directly at key target sets that have strategic results,
without having to go through the process of drawn-out attrition at the tactical level of
war" [AFDD 2-1, p. 8]. With airpower, all three corners of Clausewitz's trinity can be
attacked at once. This was the case in Desert Storm and is fundamental to Warden's
theory and current Air Force doctrine.

2.4. Current Combat Modeling Techniques
Most current combat models are excellent tools for their designed purpose, but are
not appropriate for the study of strategic effects. As stated before, AFDD 1 delineates
three fundamentals of war. The reason current models fail to capture strategic effects ties
to each of these fundamentals, discussed separately in the following sections.
2.4.1. War is an instrument of national policy
This first fundamental says, "Victory in war is not measured by casualties
inflicted, battles won or lost, or territory occupied, but by whether or not political
objectives were achieved." Combat models use measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to
measure victory with the most common MOEs being casualties inflicted and territory
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occupied (forward line of own troops (FLOT) movement). This is the Lanchester
equation paradigm.
2.4.1.1. Lanchester Equations
The Lanchester equations were published in 1914 ironically to try to determine the
impact of aircraft on ground combat [Battilega and Grauge, p. 553]. Today some form of
these equations is found in a significant percentage of combat models as the method for
the adjudication of combat. They are based on the assumption that attrition is
proportional to the size of the forces engaged in combat. These equations are
deterministic differential equations. The unalterable outcome of combat adjudication is
based on the starting troop strengths and their attrition rates (Pk).
Lanchester equations are still popular and widely used despite their many
recognized flaws. The equations are simple, easy to compute, and give intuitive results.
Unfortunately, the original equations do not accurately model many historical battles
[Battilega and Grauge, p. 92]. Some historical battles have been "modeled" successfully
by fitting the equation attrition coefficients to match the actual attrition of the battle or
distinct segments of the battle.
Many people have made modifications in the past 50 years to shore up the original
equations and have tried to validate these modifications with historical data. Helmbold is
one of the most successful, but his formulation [Hartley] is designed and validated for
"classic" battles that have approximately 10% attrition. If the battle varies from this type
of conflict, the model becomes less reliable.
The reality is that attrition rates are not predefined or even stable. Thus,
prediction with a Lanchester-based model is nearly impossible. It is even more difficult
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in some future conflict where the nature of the battle is not yet known. Analysts can
make the Lanchester equations fit the data but they cannot fit the future, especially when
US doctrine seeks to avoid the "attrition" warfare approach.
2.4.1.2. Casualties vs. Causalities
The Lanchester type attrition ratios can be correlated to the outcome of the battle,
but except in extreme cases of annihilation, attrition alone does not end battles. Political
decisions based on military capability, national will, and the commander's intent are just
as influential. Attrition is not a surrogate for victory. Davis and Blumenthal [Davis and
Blumenthal, p. 8] point out some shortcomings of traditional types of models
Typically, ground-combat simulations focus on complex calculations of attrition
while treating command-control processes, tactics, and strategy in terms of
stereotypes embedded in the data bases. This ignores the evidence of history that
such matters (and other "soft factors") are first-order determinants of both
deterrence and war outcomes, and should therefore be highlighted.
In other words, many important factors are not usually captured in our models.
Zimm [Zimm, p. 9] proposes "the causal model of warfare." His premise is that
while attrition can be correlated to the outcome (victory) of a battle, it cannot predict it.
Zimm [Zimm, p. 6] describes the benefits of tactical maneuver and how they are absent
from today's method of attrition-based ground combat models. Zimm proposes that
maneuver warfare attacks the enemy morale, cohesion and fighting spirit as well as the
soldiers by operating inside the enemy's OODA loop [Zimm, p. 5]. He hypothesizes that
maneuver warfare causes opponents to make decisions under stress in a fundamentally
different way [Zimm, p. 25]. "If maneuver warfare confuses the enemy, and a confused
enemy is easier to defeat, then we must model the capability to confuse and the results of
the confusion" [Zimm, p. 22]. This sub-optimal decision making process causes errors
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which become military opportunities and yield synergistic results. These hard to quantify,
synergistic results are nearly identical to the Air Force's expectations of strategic effects.
To introduce political objectives into any model, those objectives and the
maximum price the entities are willing to pay to achieve those objectives must be
translated into militarily quantifiable terms. That cost may be an attrition number, a
casualty exchange ratio, or an expenditure of a critical resource. It may be a loss of
international prestige. The military objective would be to raise the price of that objective
higher than the enemy is willing to pay while keeping our own costs within our own
budgets. A full price does not need to be extracted from the enemy to achieve victory.
The enemy just has to recognize that the price will be higher than he is willing or able to
pay. That recognition is a strategic effect.
2.4.2. War is a complex and chaotic human endeavor
This element of the nature of war explains that".. .uncertainty, unpredictability,
and unreliability are always present" [AFDD 1, p. 6]. This directly conflicts with some of
the more predominant model mathematical foundations. The traditional mathematical
constructs of determinism and stochastisism are discussed next.
Many models, including the Lanchester-based models, are deterministic or have
rigid rules and equations of war activity. If combat were indeed deterministic, there
would be no need for war. Analysts would figure out who would win based on the
capabilities each side was willing to commit, and sign the peace treaty. Deterministic
models do not reflect the nature or causes of war. They only describe the symptoms.
These models work well when trying to compare different hardware, etc., while holding
the nature of the battle constant, but they are ineffective for studying strategic effects.
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The next step up in mathematical modeling is stochastic models. These models
have firm rules about combat like deterministic models, but some of the coefficients in
these equations are represented by random variables instead of constant values.
Stochastic variables have a strong place in models when examining events that behave
like random variables such as hardware component life, ballistic errors, supply line
waiting times (queue length). Human reaction and decisions in battle are not random
fluctuations around an otherwise fixed law of war and representing decisions
stochastically is not appropriate. Our doctrine and military experience offer flexible and
situational principles of war that are to be applied to tactical decisions, not laws of war
that prescribe the decisions. These stochastic models still assume underlying laws of war
that are too rigid to meet the conditions set forth in the second element of the nature of
war.
Many of the deterministic and stochastic models have linear characteristics,
although combat is recognized a nonlinear. An experiment by RAND [Dewar, et,al.]
studied a simple deterministic Lanchester based model of ground combat. This study
showed that if the decision to send reinforcements to the battle was based on the
condition of the battle through something like a force ratio threshold, that reinforcement
decision introduced nonlinearities into the model. Mathematically, the reinforcement
decision based on the state of the battle provided a feedback loop to the linear Lanchester
attrition calculations. Real war has the potential for many such feedback loops. These
types of feedback loops produced non-monotonic (unpredictable) outcomes to the
simulated battle that met most of the criteria for mathematical chaos. Adding more
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restrictions or inputs to the model did not eliminate this behavior. The significance of
chaos is that the outcomes do not settle out to a steady state or a predictable cycle.
Dynamical systems, like the attrition model with feedback, can exist in three
states [Rinaldi]. They can be non-chaotic or stable such as a linear system and absorb or
dampen disturbances. Deterministic or stochastic models may be capable of modeling the
system in this state. The system can be in a chaotic or unstable state where a small
disturbance leads to unpredictable, often catastrophic results. The third state lies on the
border between the stable and unstable region and is known as the complex region. The
ideas of mathematical chaos and complexity are discussed later.
2.4.2.1. Chaos
Mathematical chaos theory examines the behavior of and interactions between a
system of entities instead of studying the entities themselves. These systems are often
nonlinear. Ilachinski [Hachinski, p. 5] characterizes chaos as the study of how simple
systems can generate complicated behavior. Chaos theory is used to describe dynamic
systems that through simple interaction between elements provide distinct periods of very
stable, predictable behavior. The transition between these stable periods often becomes
erratic and unpredictable, i.e., mathematical chaos. These transitions can be seen as shifts
in the tempo or momentum of the battle and can be caused by a single event. These
chaotic transition states between periods may be the elusive overwhelming strategic
effects. While this chaotic behavior is not predictable, it is also not random. Many of the
defining qualities of chaotic systems [James, p. 38] such as nonlinearity, sensitivity to
small disturbances, and mixing or interrelations between the variables are found in
combat.
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2.4.2.2. Complexity
Mathematical complexity is on the boundary of chaos. Hachinski
[Hachinski, p. 6] describes complexity as "...the study of the behavior of
collections of simple (and typically nonlinearly) interacting parts that can evolve
and adapt to a changing environment." He contrasts chaos to complexity by
noting that chaos involves the study of how simple systems can generate
complicated behavior while complexity involves the study of how complicated
systems can generate simple behavior [Hachinski, p. 5]. The complex system is
complicated because although it may have simple components, these components
have interactions that generate a group behavior not characteristic of any
individual's behavior. These components are usually hierarchically organized
with a decentralized control or a lack of rigid external control. This is analogous
to a military system with a hierarchical command and control system, but where
each combatant ultimately decides upon and takes their own actions. Complex
systems also have dynamics simultaneously from top to bottom and from bottom
to top. This is true in military operations where a commander's orders influence
the combatants' actions and the combatants' actions influence the commander's
orders [Ilachinski, p. 11]. Mathematical complexity seems a very reasonable
vantage point from which to approach strategic effects considering the second
element of the nature of war.
2.4.2.3. Complex Adaptive Models
A special application of complexity theory is complex adaptive systems.
The key to this type of model is that there is no "divine" omnipotent code that
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controls the behavior of each combatant. Instead, the combatants are given a set
of rules (doctrine) and an individual personality that favors following some rules
over others. The individual agents are then responsible for making their own
decisions as to how they should prosecute the battle. These decisions are
influenced by the exact conditions surrounding the individual at the time of the
decision
Ilachinski has developed a complex adaptive model, Irreducible SemiAutonomous Adaptive Combat (ISAAC), to simulate the interactions between
small groups of marines. He found that the Lanchester-based models did not
simulate the "marine style" of fighting. That is, small independent well-trained
units utilizing maneuver instead of a Lanchesterian consistent line of average
soldiers. Ilachinski objects to the deterministic and aggregated Lanchester based
models [Ilachinski (1997), p. iii] because they ".. .completely disregard the human
factor in combat."
According to Ilachinski [Ilachinski, p. 39], complexity theory
"...represents a shift of emphasis from force-on-force attrition calculations to
consideration of high-level behaviors that emerge naturally from low-level rules."
Complexity theory "...provides theoretical backbone to understanding aggregate
behavior as fundamentally nonlinear and synergistic" [Ilachinski, p. 39]. It also
introduces qualitative characteristics into combat. These characteristics include
unit cohesion, morale, and leadership. A model based in complexity theory might
meet the requirements of the second fundamental of the nature of war.
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2.4.3. War is a clash of opposing wills
An enemy can be highly unpredictable... Victory results from creating
advantages against thinking adversaries bent on creating their own
advantages. [AFDD 1, p. 6]
The models used to help answer the big questions in the U.S. military are the
aggregated theater level models. The aggregation or averaging process strips this third
element of the nature of war from combat models. These models try to simulate joint
warfare with thousands of combatants employing hundreds of different weapon systems
against capable if not similar opponents. Because of the vast amount of data and number
of calculations required for such a broad based model, most entities are averaged or
aggregated from higher resolution models that model smaller pieces of the battle in
greater detail. The problem is that an average calculated from very high detail or fidelity
loses detail.
2.4.3.1. Problems with Aggregation
Davis [Davis (1997), p. 28] points out that we can not work upwards in a model
family (a chain of successively broader but less detailed models) with aggregated values
or averages "without introducing errors that propagate with complex consequences."
This is because the aggregate values are context dependent. The results from the higher
(broader) models will only be accurate if the aggregate values are used in the same
context from which they were created. This level of data verification is not common.
Davis [Davis (1997), p. 41] suggests that, "Macroscopic behaviors have a coherence of
their own that may not be readily understandable in terms of a more reductionist picture."
In other words there may be large-scale influences that are inappropriate to model or
unobservable at the lower level of the greater fidelity models.
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Calculations are aggregate measures. Individual combatants are not actually
modeled in most simulations nor is their initiative. Their contribution to lethality
(firepower) and vulnerability is embedded in average values common to all other entities
in the FLOT segment. The battle is waged as FLOT segment versus FLOT segment and
attrition is uniformly calculated.
Another problem with aggregated models is that maneuver and other tactical
advantages are not considered. One of Hachinski's motivators for development of
ISAAC was that Lanchester attrition calculations do not "account for spatial variation of
forces" or advantage of maneuver. He explained this as ".. .the fundamental principles
underlying modern land warfare with its general emphasis on maneuver and adaptation
cannot be elucidated from analysis of force on force attrition alone" [Hachinski (1997),
pp. 3-4]. This is also the crux of the work by Zimm. Aggregated models do not model
the variance in outcome due to brilliance or ineptness of individuals in the situation.
These models have no way to capture this third fundamental of the nature of war.
2.4.3.2. Unable to capture modern Joint operations
Taylor doubts whether the aggregated Lanchester equations can capture modern warfare
where the effectiveness levels of combatants may vary over the duration of the battle.
Table 1 summarizes his opinions. Taylor considers the shaded area, below his "line of
feasibility" least applicable to Lanchester equations. This region is representative of
modern joint warfare with combined arms and fluctuating operations tempos and weapon
firing intensities. A new modeling paradigm must be developed to support this region.
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No Replacements
Variable
Constant
Coefficients Coefficients

Replacements
Variable
Constant
Coefficients Coefficients

Two Homogenous Forces

Very Easy

Difficult

Easy

Very
Difficult

Two Homogenous Forces
With Supporting Fires Not
Subject To Attrition

Easy

Very
Difficult

Not too
Easy

Very
Difficult

Heterogeneous Forces
(Several Combatant Types)

Difficult

Very
Difficult

Impossible

Heterogeneous Forces
(Many Combatant Types)

Essentially
Impossible

Impossible

Impossible

Essentially
; Impossible
Impossible

Table 1. Taylor's classification of LANCHESTER-type equations for "modern warfare"
and their ease of solution by analytical methods. [Taylor, P- 248]

Aggregate models use expected values or most probable outcomes, but strategic
effects are anything but typical. Unfortunately, we lack the data to model strategic effects
as probabilistic outcomes. Rather, strategic effects modeling should explore the range of
possible outcomes in an attempt to better understand the phenomenon. To examine
strategic effects, we must begin to model adaptive behavior and the decision processes
(OODA loops) of the individuals at the appropriate levels of conflict.

2.5. THUNDER and Strategic Effects
THUNDER is the Air Force's premier theater-level combat model. THUNDER
plans and executes 23 air missions that interact with ground combat. There is even
limited capability for modeling naval and littoral combat. THUNDER accounts for most
typical aspects and considerations in modern joint warfare. Most of the physical aspects
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of a strategic attack and many of the entities expected to be effected by strategic attack
can be modeled. THUNDER was designed to expressly model the air planning cycle
[AFSAA]. This is effectively the theater-level joint forces air component commander's
(JFACC) OODA loop and is the heart of THUNDER'S capabilities.
The THUNDER air mission planning cycle takes apportionment guidance,
available resources, intelligence estimates of enemy resources, and target prioritization
doctrine as inputs or observations. THUNDER orients this information into an allocation
of resources and a target list. The assignment of allocated resources to targets to form a
mission is THUNDER'S decision. THUNDER'S air mission planning cycle acts by
generating an air tasking order (ATO) and giving missions to the simulated units
[AFSAA, p. 20]. This OODA cycle occurs at user-specified regular intervals, often every
12 simulation hours.
2.5.1. Strategic Attack Capabilities in THUNDER
THUNDER has a mission type devoted to strategic attack. In this mission area,
strategic targets are defined, targeted, and attacked but the effects of attacks on these
targets do not influence prosecution of the war. The strategic attack mission in
THUNDER is basically a penalty mission that consumes resources that could otherwise
be used against interdiction or tactical targets that directly impact typical MOEs. Thus,
THUNDER does not specifically model direct strategic effects. The question then
becomes whether or not THUNDER captures indirect strategic effects.
2.5.2. THUNDER'S Air War
THUNDER'S air planning OODA cycle is the same for both sides of the battle.
The air planning OODA loop lengths can not be changed quantitatively to show or
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exploit an advantage. The OODA cycle may be effected qualitatively as strategic effects
can impact the quality of a decision. THUNDER allows for direct interdiction of C3I
nodes and models a corresponding degrade on the targeted system. It also models the
effect of poor intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) on the command and
control system and degrades mission effectiveness due to poor ISR. THUNDER allows
for a very detailed supply distribution system that is fully interdictable. THUNDER also
monitors the movement, use, and attrition of POL and any other designated critical
resource. Interdiction attacks may have an OODA influence by logistically restricting
options in the orient phase or foiling them in the act phase. Direct attacks on first and
second echelon troops in missions such as close air support can also limit decision
options and prevent decisions from being carried out. THUNDER also models
simultaneous parallel attacks on targets in various strategic systems.
THUNDER'S air war does not use OODA loops at any level of the simulation
lower than the JFACC. The adjudication of the rest of the air war is stochastic. Again
the results of the stochastic air war do feed and impact the air planning OODA cycle, but
the air combatants do not have OODAs of their own.
2.5.3. THUNDER'S Ground War
One of the common concerns with THUNDER is that while it is predominantly an
air model, many of its results are explained in terms of the ground war. THUNDER'S
primary measure of effectiveness (MOE) is movement of FLOT based on attrition of the
ground forces. This is not unreasonable since the ground war generates targets for a
significant number of air missions. Without prosecuting a realistic ground war in the
model, the air planning and targeting processes would be less realistic. This link between
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air and ground also sounds very reasonable for a campaign level model aimed at joint
operations.
The ground war in THUNDER is deterministic. Major movements of ground
forces or the rules to make such moves are scripted into the campaign scenario.
THUNDER simply uses the Army Concept Analysis Agency (CAA) ATCAL algorithms
to adjudicate the attrition of forces and keep track of the munitions used [AFSAA].
ATCAL improves over Lanchester attrition algorithms in that it develops its own
optimized attrition coefficients. The resulting attrition then drives force ratio determined
reinforcement decisions and FLOT movement. These results are fed back into the air
planning cycle for use in target selection and prioritization.
ATCAL attempts to address the recognized nonlinearities of battle in a method
similar to blending the different forms of Lanchester equations to meet the situation
[Hartman, p. 5-3]. Instead of averaging attrition across the entire force, ATCAL applies
the attrition calculations on a weapon-by-weapon basis. ATCAL calculates these
coefficients to make attrition computations for each weapon-target combination. Next,
ATCAL uses a nonlinear iterative search until each weapon type has a near optimal target
priority list (firing doctrine) to maximize the shooters' contribution to the battle.
THUNDER then uses these optimized ground target priorities and weapon lethality scores
to calculate the final result of the ground combat cycle. These priorities and attrition rates
are recalculated within THUNDER every ground combat cycle (usually 12 or 24 hours of
simulated combat).
Although ATCAL is a significant advance over traditional Lanchester equations,
THUNDER does not adequately capture strategic effects. THUNDER remains a highly
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aggregate model. The optimized units or combatants remain too homogenous and nonadaptive. Capabilities and results remain FLOT-segment oriented. Finally, there is no air
planning OODA loop equivalent in the ground war, removing any strategic effect link
between the air and ground components.

2.6. Developing a Model to Explore Strategic effects
One method for modeling the effect of an attack on a strategy is by modeling its
impact on OODA cycles. To prove the viability of this concept a model is developed to
examine whether OODA length differences produce the synergistic and catastrophic
advantage expected from a strategic attack as predicted by current AF doctrine.
Most current combat models are research models [Davis and Blumenthal] and are
consolidative in nature. That is, the models attempt to embody all current knowledge
about an event in order to be used as a surrogate for that event [Bankes]. However, little
is known about strategic effects and field experience is limited. Instead a model is
needed with which to explore the options and issues of strategic effects. Armed with
such a model, one may gain insight into strategic effects by using the concept of
exploratory modeling [Banks]. Complex adaptive models are inherently exploratory. A
complex adaptive model in which combatant OODA loop lengths vary (presumably due
to strategic targeting) is proposed, developed, and used for exploratory analysis of
strategic effects.
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STRATEGIC
TARGET
Strategic Entity
System
System's
Leadership

Violence

Reason

Chance

Leader's will
Pol/Mil Leadership
Laws
Customs / Morals
(civic/religious
doctrine)

Nation's will/ability
Culture
National leadership
Customs / Morals
(civic/religious
doctrine)

Military ability
Small unit (squadron)
Political Leadership
Civic/religious doctrine
Military Leadership
Military Doctrine

Organic
System's
essentials

National Support
National Resources
National Need
Military Capability

Belief in political goal
Foreseeable
improvement

Weapons
Training/Doctrine
Loyalty/cohesion
Conviction in cause/leader

System's
Infrastructure

Communications

Communications

Communications
Logistic system
Mobility system

System's
Population

Citizens
Allied nations

Impact on lifestyle
Expectation of gain

Soldier or basic combat
element

System's
Fighting
Mechanism

Personal sacrifice of
Military
citizen
Political machine (UN)
Media
Propaganda

Typical Agent

Citizens

Courses of Action

Fielded weapons systems

Basic combatants (or crew)

Table 2. Strategic systems appropriate for OODA exploitation experiments with
autonomous agents.

2.6.1. A Proof of Concept Model
To prove that OODA advantage translates into strategic advantage the model
represents individuals with their own OODA decision processes. These individuals
represent any level of decision-making entities. Some likely choices are shown in Table 2.
For this effort these individuals will be modeled as basic combatants. The method
by which the OODA advantage is achieved is not critical at this time, only the fact that
the OODA advantage exists and that it effects the outcome. Since an OODA advantage is
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a phenomenon of finite time, the model should have continuous exploitation, therefore a
constant OODA advantage for one side is most appropriate for proving the concept.
2.6.2. Model Format
The prototype model for this research is influenced by the ISAAC model. ISAAC
is a complex adaptive system of combat marine "agents" in a ground warfare
environment. Most complex adaptive models consist of agents that independent actions
and decisions at uniform time intervals. In these models, a master schedule or simulation
clock controls these time intervals, which typically use a common timing scheme (OODA
loop length) for all agents' actions. In contrast, multi-threading is used to keep the agents
in this model as autonomous as possible. Multi-threading allows several programs to run
on the computer simultaneously. The advantage in this case is that each agent is its own
self-contained mini-program and runs relatively free of the typical control and overhead
of the main program. The programming language Java was chosen because it
incorporates multithreading. Each multi-threaded agent has an adjustable length OODA
loop.
2.6.2.1. The Playing Field
The simulation battleground is rectangular and contains two solid squares
representing the base of each force in opposite (diagonal) corners (see Figure 9).
Each force, the blue and the red, is initialized with a typical strength of 20 combatants in
front of their respective base. During the simulation, those agents that are killed are
moved to the lateral boarder of the battlefield and turn pale in color. Those agents that
reach their goal of the enemy base are moved to the vertical boarders and highlighted in
white (see Figure 10). A shot is indicated by a solid line of the color of the shooter.
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Figure 9. Sample simulation at initialization
2.6.2.2. Agent External Behavior
The agents initialize to positions near their base. When the simulation begins the
agents move toward the enemy's base to attack. The agents try to keep a specified
minimum distance from other agents. If enemy agents are encountered the agents must
decide to either attack, fall back and regroup, or continue advancing toward the enemy
base. These decisions are based upon the force ratio within each agent's field of view.
User adjustable (doctrinal) force ratio thresholds define these decisions. If the base is
attacked and the agent is within communications range of his base, he may be recalled to
defend the base. An agent defending his base is assumed to have a prepared defensive
posture and is able to withstand a few more hits from enemy weapons. If an agent
decides
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Figure 10. Sample simulation during run

to attack, he moves to a point on a line between the perceived center of mass of the
enemy and his base. The position on that line is at his doctrinal best firing range from the
perceived enemy's center of mass. The success of an agent's shot is based on the Pk
specified for the agent. There is a linear accuracy degrade if the agent shoots from
between his optimal firing range and his maximum firing range. If the agent decides to
regroup, he moves to the perceived center of mass of his own troops. The agent's exact
move is toward the average of the moves he should make for each activity (attack,
regroup, etc.) weighted by his personality preferences (individual weightings or
tendencies to favor one behavioral rule over another) for each activity. An agent's
maximum speed or distance per OODA cycle also restricts the move.
2.6.2.3. Agent Internal Behavior
An agent's internal actions are processed as an OODA loop. Each agent observes
all other agents within his field of view. The agent then orients by prioritizing his threats
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and keeping track of a specified maximum number (default is 1) of threats. He computes
the center of mass for the threats he is tracking and for the friendlies he can see or
communicate with. He compares the force ratios for the friendly to the enemy and
decides the most advantageous position to accomplish his objectives based on doctrine
and personality. The agent then calculates a firing solution on the enemy threats. At this
point the agent's thread is put to sleep to represent the finite amount of time required to
think through the decision process and put the decision into action. While each step in
the OODA loop has a finite amount of time associated with it, the sum of all those delays
is represented at this one point in the model. When the agent thread wakes up or resumes
operation, he moves to his precalculated optimum position. The actual position may be
adjusted slightly to keep from stepping on another agent who has also chosen a "best"
position close by. The agent then fires at the precomputed target coordinates of each
enemy he has labeled a threat. This penalizes an agent with old information. A targeted
agent can not return fire immediately, but must wait to complete his OODA cycle. There
is no wounded status and it takes only one hit to kill an agent.

2.7. The Experiment
For the purposes of this experiment the exact behavior of the agents is not as
important as the fact that the behavior is the result of an OODA process. The only
concept for action that must be adhered to is that there must be a discernable penalty for
acting with poor information. The behavior described above meets this criterion.
The purpose of the experiment is to study how two comparable forces fare given
differing OODA loop lengths. Can an OODA difference provided by strategic attack
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really deliver the knockout blow? A longer OODA process can be manifested in two
ways. The first is that the decision and corresponding action get delayed. This could be
extra time in gathering information, sorting through options (including waiting for orders
to be issued), committing to a decision, or just putting the action into motion. This will
be the first scenario in the experiment. The second manifestation is when a time critical
decision must be made but the decision-maker has incomplete information. This will be
the second scenario in the experiment. The first scenario in the experiment changes only
the OODA length. The red agents will make fewer decisions and take fewer actions than
the blue. In the second scenario, the speed of the red agent is increased proportional to
the increase in OODA length. The impaired (red) agents can move at the same overall
rate as the blue agents, but make longer range decisions and have less reaction capability.
2.7.1. Experimental Design
The experiment consisted of 4 scenarios, each with 17 cases. The first scenario is
the baseline and kept the maximum speed the same for each agent. That is the agents
moved the same maximum distance per OODA cycle. The red made fewer decisions and
moved at a correspondingly slower average rate than the blue. The second scenario gave
the red agents a speed increase proportional to their OODA length increase.
Scenario
1
2
3
4

Maximu Ti speed
Blue
fixed
fixed
fixed
fixed

Red
fixed
varies
fixed
fixed

Initial Strength
Blue
20
20
20
20

Red
20
20
40
20

Table 3. Summary of experiment scenarios
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Probabil ixy or nil
(SS PK)
Blue
Red
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
1.0

This gave the red fewer decisions, but further distance per decision and about the
same miles per hour as the blue. The third scenario had the same max speed as in the first
scenario, but red's initial force size is double that of the blue. The fourth scenario
increased red's weapons effectiveness to twice that of blue. Each case of each scenario
had a different OODA differential. The OODA differential was increased from no
advantage to a 400% advantage in 25% increments. A 400% OODA advantage means
blue will be completing 5 decision cycles to every one of red's. This may be unrealistic
in a real situation, but was included in the experiment to study the nature of the
phenomenon. Each case was run for 30 repetitions to collect statistics. A sample of the
number of agents alive and the number of agents that penetrated the enemy base was
taken at each second during the simulation. The simulation run time was restricted to 20
seconds, which allowed most of the agents alive after the fight to reach their goal (the
enemy base). The two metrics used are the number of alive agents and the number of
agents at the goal.
2.7.2. Results
The OODA differential has a significant impact on the outcome of the "battle." In
all scenarios, the blue gained a significant advantage with OODA increase, although the
advantage did not increase monotonically.
2.7.2.1. Scenario 1. Case 0: No OODA Advantage
The number of agents that are alive throughout the battle are shown in Figure 11.
Red has an unexpected advantage due to the nature of the battlefield. Specifically, red is
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Figure 11. Average number of alive agents with respect to time in Scenario 1, Case 1
(no OODA advantage)

in a position to fire first and this gives red an early advantage that it maintains. Both
sides suffer attrition near 50% before disengaging to advance toward their respective
goals.
2.7.2.2. Composite View of Scenario 1
Each of the other cases in scenario 1 had blue with an OODA advantage. The
curves of attrition with respect to time for each case can be placed next to each other to
produce a 'landscape' surface of the number of agents alive. These landscapes are shown
for the blue in Figure 12 and for the red in Figure 13. The case 1 (no OODA advantage)
attrition curves from Figure 11 are shown as the left edges of the landscapes. When blue
has a 50% OODA advantage it has a clear advantage in both attrition and reaching the
goal. Blue is in complete control of the situation when there is greater than a 50% OODA
advantage. There blue attrition falls to almost nothing. Reds attrition continues to fall,
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but is marked by a somewhat regular cycle of ridges and valleys. These ridges and
valleys are from the relative firing advantage derived from the specific physical
characteristics of the simulation. There are two causes for these ridges and valleys, which
is discussed in terms of a red ridge. The first is that a red move left many of the agents
just outside of blue's firing range and put red in a good position to fire on the next move,
giving a red first strike advantage. The second is that both sides were advancing to fire
and charged passed each other without much of a fight and fewer casualties. The nature
of these ridges and valleys change with the average step size (speed) and weapons range
of the agents and their relative position at initialization.
Similar landscapes showing the number of agents to reach their goals are given in
Figure 14 and Figure 15 although the orientation of the landscapes is changed to better
see the results.
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A comparison of the average final attrition for both sides can be seen in Figure 16.
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Figure 16. Exchange Ratios for Scenario 1

Lanchester predictions where made to test if the OODA advantage results differ
from traditional model predictions. The Lanchester equations have two main variables.
These are the attrition rate coefficients for the two opposing sides. This coefficient is
defined as the rate of fire (p) times the single-shot probability of kill (SSPK). The SSPK
is fixed in this scenario at 0.5 for both sides. The rate of fire can change with OODA
advantage since the blue have an opportunity to shoot once in the act phase of each
OODA. This rate of fire is the only variable that is actively changed between cases. The
ratio of the blue attrition rate to the red attrition rate is expected to be no greater than the
OODA advantage. This was not the case. In fact, the observed ratio of attrition
coefficients differed so much from the OODA advantage that a logarithmic
transformation was needed to view results (see Figure 18). This view clearly shows that
the results of the simulation with an OODA advantage are drastically (synergistically)
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Figure 17. Observed versus expected ratios of Lanchester attrition rate coefficients

different than the Lanchester prediction. If on the other hand, the actual attrition data is
put into the Lanchester equations in an effort to derive attrition coefficients, the
Logarithmic Transformation of Ratio of Lanchester Coefficients(b/a)
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Figure 18. The In transformation of the ratios of Lanchester coefficients in scenario 1

Lanchester equations can be made to 'fit' the data. In fact in Figure 19, the Lanchester
square, linear, and mixed laws all follow the general shape of the 'real' data. This
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demonstrates Hartley's point that many forms of the Lanchester equations can be made to
fit data [Hartley, p. 448], but not reliably predict outcomes.
Logarithmic Transformation of the Fit Ratio of Lanchester CoefRcients(b/a)
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Figure 19. The ratios of coefficients of various Lanchester laws 'fit' to scenariol data

2.7.2.3. Reasons for the Effects
Recall that the two components of the Lanchester attrition rate coefficients are
rate of fire and SSPK. Even though the SSPK was held constant, it effectively changed in
the execution of the model. The SSPK can be broken down into the probability that the
shot hits the target (PH) times the probability that the shot kills the target if it was a hit
(PK/H)-

The probability that the shot hits the target is primarily due to the accuracy of the

weapon system, especially if the target is fixed. If the target is a non-cooperative target
and maneuvers during the shot, the target effects the probability that it will be hit. This is
the case demonstrated in Figure 20 and contributes to the rapid increase in blue
survivability. This effect can be seen in the effective SSPK calculated from the model
output (see Figure 21). Blue's SSPK stays constantly near the specified value of 0.5,
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while red's SSPK begins to drop significantly at around the 150% OODA advantage
point.

Cooperative Target

Non-Cooperative Target
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1 •
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Figure 20. Cooperative and non-cooperative targets
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Figure 22. Average Number of Shots Taken in Scenario 1

The maneuver advantage given by the quicker OODA loop also allows blue to get
into a firing position faster. The OODA advantage allows blue to fire before red can
respond (surprise). The effect is that those red preparing to fire are killed before the
reaching the act (shoot) phase and the 'second echelon' red are not yet preparing to fire
when the blue engage. The result of this is that the red make fewer shots in the first few
moments of combat leaving blue with an insurmountable numerical superiority. Figure
22 shows' the average number of shots taken for each case in scenario 1. Fewer shots
taken and a lower actual SSPK for those shots quickly drive the red attrition rate
coefficients to near zero.
2.7.2.4. Scenario 2: Red Speed is Proportional to OODA Difference
In this scenario the distance a red agent can go on a single move is increased
proportionally to the reds' OODA length disadvantage. The result is the red move at the
same average speed as the blue even though it completes fewer OODAs. This 'forces'
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red to make decisions further in advance of their moves, giving them less current
information. The results (see Figure 23 and Figure 26) are very similar to those in
scenario 1, although the ridges and valleys on the landscapes (see Figure 24 and Figure
25) have shifted due to the change in red step size. The agents especially have more of a
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Figure 23. Exchange Ratio in Scenario 2

tendency to run past each other in this scenario as the OODA length and red maximum
speed get large. The SSPK drops quickly for red, but shows a region of improvement
linked again to the time-space relationships of the battle. This point is where the blue
OODA cycle effectively "laps" the red, putting the red in a more advantageous position
although an inconsequential cycle behind (see Figure 27). This demonstrates one
criticism of Boyd's theory, that faster OODAs are not always better [Fadock, p. 18].
Instead, the best OODA pace is one that is comfortable for you, but not for the enemy.
The number of shots fired in this scenario drops very fast for the red showing again that
blue's first strike advantage is intensified by red's long decision lead time (see Figure 28).
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Logarithmic Transformation of Ratio of Lanchester Coefficients(b/a)
(Red Speed is Proportional to OODA)
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Figure 26. The In Transformation of the Ratios of Lanchester Coefficients in Scenario 2
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Figure 27. Average Measured SSPK in Scenario 2
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Figure 28. Average Number of Shots Taken in Scenario 2
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2.7.2.5. Scenario 3: Red initial force size is double that of the blue
Scenario 3 initializes red with 40 agents and blue with 20. Red's initial size gives
it quite an advantage over the other scenarios. Blue is just as effective as before, but the
number of red nullifies the blue first-strike, leaving a fairly even match for the remainder
of the battle. With only a 25% OODA advantage, blue matches red attrition and
maintains its relative force size (20 fewer agents). This turns the apparent square law
situation into a linear law result. With an OODA advantage of just over 200%, blue
overcomes its initial deficit and ends the battle with a greater number of surviving agents
(see Figure 29).
Average Exchange Ratio
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Figure 29. Exchange Ratio in Scenario 3

The red SSPK (Figure 31) is not as sensitive to the OODA advantage in this
scenario. This is because the blue first strike does not kill most of the 'ready' red
shooters. The higher number of surviving red shooters are in a good firing position with
vulnerable blue agents that are just beginning the observe phase. The number of red shots
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Logarithmic Transformation of Ratio of Lanchester Coefficients(b/a)
(20 Blue vs. 40 Red)
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Figure 30. The In of the Ratios of Lanchester Coefficients in Scenario 3

Average Single Shot Probability of Kill
(20 Blue vs. 40 Red)

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

250

275

300

325

350

375

400

Percent OODA Advantage

Figure 31. Average Measured SSPK in Scenario 3
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Figure 32. Average Number of Shots Taken in Scenario 3
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Figure 33. Landscape of Alive Blue Agents for Scenario 3
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Figure 34. Landscape of Alive Red Agents for Scenario 3
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(Figure 32) also tapers of much more gradually in this scenario as more alive red agents
take opportunities to return fire.
2.7.2.6. Scenario 4: Red weapon effectiveness is double that of the blue
Red enjoys a clear attrition advantage with low OODA differential due to their
increased firepower. This advantage is lost with an OODA differential of 75% or greater
(see Figure 35). The results of this scenario (see Figure 36, Figure 39, and Figure 40)
resemble those of the first two scenarios despite the higher red SSPK (Figure 37). This is
because red doesn't have many opportunities to take shots (see Figure 38) to capitalize on
its strength when blue has an OODA advantage.
Average Exchange Ratio
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Figure 35. Exchange Ratio in Scenario 4
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Logarithmic Transformation of Ratio of Lanchester Coefficients (b/a)
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Figure 36. The In of the Ratios of Lanchester Coefficients in Scenario 4
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Figure 37. Average Measured SSPK in Scenario 4
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Figure 38. Average Number of Shots Taken in Scenario 4
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Figure 39. Landscape of Alive Blue Agents for Scenario 4
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Figure 40. Landscape of Alive Red Agents for Scenario 4
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2.8. Conclusions
The OODA exploitation model of strategic effects is consistent with the doctrinal
foundation set forth in Air Force doctrine documents. It attempts to focus on the nature of war
instead of the mechanics of attrition. The insight to the nature of war comes not only from AF
doctrine, but also from Clausewitz. The model combines the modern theories of Warden and
Boyd and explains some discrepancies established by Pape.
The model is different than most contemporary combat models because it models simple
'situational decisions' made by autonomous agents instead of adjudicating theoretical and elusive
rigid laws of combat. Deterministic and stochastic models of combat are too inflexible to show
the impact of human decisions on the battle. Aggregation robs initiative and other tactical
advantages from the combatants. THUNDER is founded on a decision cycle, but cannot carry
the decision process modeling down to the level of combat to show OODA exploitation.
All four scenarios of the experiment show a beneficial effect from OODA exploitation.
A blue OODA advantage was not only decisive in otherwise even fights, but also quickly eroded
a red military advantage. This is consistent with the doctrinal expectations of strategic effects.
The advantage comes from the 'initiative' of the blue, who capitalize on a tactical opportunity for
a first-strike attack before red is prepared to respond. This initial attack puts red at an
insurmountable disadvantage for the rest of the battle in three of the scenarios and equalizes the
initial blue deficit in scenario 3. The quicker reaction time of the blue also makes them less
cooperative targets, confounding red's situation. The effect of OODA exploitation is often much
greater than the Lanchester attrition equations would reasonably predict. The effect is synergistic
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in that the advantage is disproportional to the actual increase in expenditure of firepower. This is
a classically anticipated characteristic of strategic effects.
The OODA exploitation model of strategic effects is consistent with doctrine and theory,
explains the shortcomings of other models for explaining strategic effects, and produces results
consistent with strategic effects. Autonomous agents provide a vehicle to test and validate this
approach to modeling the moral aspects of combat. The model presented in this thesis for proofof-concept does provides a reasonable starting point. The results of the proof-of-concept model
are sufficient to warrant further investigation of this concept by this means.
The outcome of battle is not predetermined. War is not random. It is a sequence of
discrete, deliberate, irreversible, interrelated events. It is characterizable but unpredictable. It is
complex.
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CHAPTER 3

Contributions of Research
In this thesis, I define a tangible method for modeling strategic effects. While this
definition may not be the only way to approach to the study of strategic effects, it does provide a
beachhead for others interested in this topic and the rest of my research. I also explain the reason
that strategic effects are difficult if not impossible to observe in typical attrition driven combat
models. I then provide a simplistic exploratory model using autonomous agents as a proof of
concept for studying strategic effects.

Areas for Continued Research
Future work may include behavior rule modifications to change the agents behavior be
realistic with various actual missions. See if OODA exploitation seems feasible in the context of
these real world missions. Also sensitivity analysis could be accomplished to find how much
OODA advantage is needed to overcome various tactical or physical advantages in different
situations. A hierarchical model could be developed to study the cascade effect. This could be
done by linking OODAs together vertically and laterally with different agent classes, then
studying the end result of OODA exploitation at each of the various levels. Non-military attack
applications could be studied by looking for strategic effects from civilian and political
population models using an OODA based model. Drawing a hard link between target sets and
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OODA disruption would also be a logical continuation of this research. This will better define
(strategic) target sets for OODA exploitation.
Internal OODA stability is a key point to Boyd's work and promises even more
synergistic effects. This moral aspect is a very important part of OODA exploitation that is not
covered by this work. The premise is that internal confusion or dismay can clog an OODA cable
with doubt. Confidence can lead to decisions with less thought. These ideas are fundamental in
the discussion of the moral aspect of combat. Study the effect of poor performance or results
slowing the OODA and, conversely, good performance quickening the OODA. This
compounding of OODA advantage could cause an acceleration of collapse in the enemy system
and demonstrate a bound for realistic OODA differentials.

70

Bibliography
Applegate, Jeffery A. The Combat Simulation of Desert Storm with Applications
for Contingency Operations. Warfare Modeling. Edited by Jerome
Bracken, Moshe Kress, and Richard E. Rosenthal. Published by the
Military Operations Research Society in cooperation with John Wiley &
Sons, 1995, pp. 565-570.
Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC). AFDC Issue: Modeling and Simulation of
Strategic Effects. Unpublished briefing slides available at
http://www.hqafdc.maxwell.af.mil/
Bankes, Steve. Exploratory Modeling. Encyclopedia of OR and MS. Edited by
Saul I Gauss and Carl M. Harris. Norwell, MA Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1996, pp. 203-204.
Battilega, John A. and Grauge, Judith K. The Military Applications of Modeling.
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Air Force Institute of Technology Press.
Beene, Eric A. Calculating a Value for Dominant Battlespace Awareness. AFIT
Thesis. Air Force Institute of Technology, 1998.
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 89-91.
Davis, Paul K (1997). Implications of Complex-Adaptive-System (CAS)
Research for Defense Analysis. Briefing slides from a presentation given
at the MORS mini-symposium and Workshop "Warfare Analysis and
Complexity" at The Johns Hopkins University (APL), (Sep 15,1997).
Davis, Paul K. and Blumenthal, Donald (1991). The Base of Sand: A White
Paper on the State of Military Combat Modeling. N-3148-OSD/DARPA
RAND, 1991.
Deitel, Harvey M. and Deitel, Paul J. Java: How to Program, Second Edition
Prentence Hall. Upper Saddle River, N.J, 1998.
Department of the Air Force. Air Force Process Improvement Guide. Total Quality Tools
for Teams and Individuals. Maxwell AFB, AL: AF Quality Center, undated.
Department of the Air Force. Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force.
AFDD 1. Washington: HQ, USAF, 1997.

71

Department of the Air Force. Air Warfare. AFDD 2-1.(Draft) Washington: HQ, USAF,
(downloaded from AFDC home page) June 1998.
Department of the Air Force. Strategic Attack. AFDD 2-1.2. Washington: HQ, USAF,
1998.
Department of the Air Force. (SEAW notes) Terms of Reference. Unpublished notes
from the Strategic Effects ofAirpower Workshop. Maxwell AFB, AL, Air
University, 1998.
Dewar, J.A, Gillogy, J.J., Juncosa, M.L. Non-Monoticity, Chaos and Combat
Models. Military Operations Research. Vol 2, No 2 (1996) pp. 37-49.
Edmonds, David K. In Search of High Ground: The Airpower Trinity and the
Decisive Potential ofAirpower. Airpower Journal. Vol XII, No. 1, Spring
1998, pp. 4-21.
Fadok, David S. John Boyd and John Warden: Air power's Quest for Strategic
Paralysis. Maxwell AFB, AL: AU Press (Feb. 1995).

Hartley, Dean S. UJ. A Mathematical Model of Attrition Data. Warfare
Modeling. Edited by Jerome Bracken, Moshe Kress, and Richard E.
Rosenthal. Published by the Military Operations Research Society in
cooperation with John Wiley & Sons, 1995. pp. 443-465.
Hartley, Dean S. DI and Helmbold, Robert L.(1995). Validating Lanchester's
Square Law and Other Attrition Models. Warfare Modeling. Edited by
Jerome Bracken, Moshe Kress, and Richard E. Rosenthal. Published by
the Military Operations Research Society in cooperation with John Wiley
& Sons, 1995. pp. 467-489.
Hartman, James K. Lecture Notes in Aggregated Combat Modeling. Edited by
Jack Kloeber Jr. and Jack Jackson. Printed as courseware by AFJT/ENS
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH (May 1998).
Ilachinski, Andrew. Complexity and Warfare: Some Possible Approaches.
Center for Naval Analyses Briefing, http://www.cna.org/isaac/lwcomp.pdf.
Ilachinski, Andrew (1997). Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat
(ISAAC): An Artificial-Life Approach to Land Warfare. CRM 97-61.10
Center for Naval Analyses. 1997.

72

James, Glenn E. Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications.
Newport Paper Number Ten (Newport, RI) Naval War Collage Press
1996.
Joint Staff, Department of Defense. Joint Doctrine for Command and Control
Warfare (C2W). JP 3-13.1, Washington: Director for Operations, Joint
Staff, 1996.
Lockwood, Stephen D. and Siddalingaiah, Madhu. Java API for Dummies.
Foster City, CA: IDG Books Worldwide, Inc, 1997.
McDonald, John W. Exploiting Battlespace Transparency: Operating Inside an
Opponents Decision Cycle. War in the Information Age: New Challenges.
Edited by Robert L. Pfaltzgraph, Jr. and Richard H Shultz, Jr.
Washington: Brassey's pp. 143-168.
Pape, Robert A. (1998a). The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power. Reprinted
from Security Studies, Vol 7, No 2 for use in the Strategic Effects of
Airpower Workshop London: Frank Cass and Co, 1998.
Pape, Robert A. (1998b). The Air Force Strikes Back: A Reply to Barry Watts
and John Warden. Reprinted from Security Studies, Vol 7, No 2 for use in
the Strategic Effects of Airpower Workshop London: Frank Cass and Co,
1998.
Rinaldi, Steven M Complexity Theory and Airpower: A new Paradigm for
Airpower in the 21st Century.
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/complexitv/chlOa.html.
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/complexitv/chlOb.html.
USAF Studies and Analysis Agency f AFSAA). THUNDER Analyst Manual
version 6.5. Prepared by System Simulation Solutions, Inc. Alexandria,
VA. also at http://info@s3i.com.
van der Linden, Peter. Just Java and Beyond. Sun Microsystems Press, Palo Alto,
CA: Prentice Hall 1998.
Warden, John A. 1X1.(1998 a). Success in Modern War: A Response to Robert
Pape's Bombing to Win. Reprinted from Security Studies, Vol 7, No 2 for
use in the Strategic Effects of Airpower Workshop London: Frank Cass
and Co, 1998.
Warden, John A. 1X1.(1998 b). The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat.
Washington: Brassey's, 1989. (First published by NDU Press, 1988).

73

Warden, John A. IJJ. (1995). The Enemy as a System. Airpower Journal. Vol DC,
No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 40-55.
Watts, Barry D. Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security
Studies. Reprinted from Security Studies, Vol 7, No 2 for use in the
Strategic Effects of Airpower Workshop London: Frank Cass and Co,
1998.
Zimm, Alan D. Modeling Maneuver Warfare: Incorporatins Human Factors and
Decisionmaking in Combat Modeling. Unpublished briefing slides,
November 1997.

74

Appendix A

Data and Calculations

75

A comparison was made with Lanchester equations to see how this OODA exploitation
model compared to more traditional modeling methods. There are three basic variations to the
original Lanchester equations and they will be examined separately.
Lanchester's Square Law
The square law is to be used in situations with direct aimed fire and is probably most
appropriate for a comparison to the OODA exploitation model. This law states the change in
force size with respect to time (attrition) is based on the number of shooters and their lethality or
kill rate. In the equation below 'a' represents the rate at which red kills blue.
d(blue)J
,
—^
- = —a* {red)
d(time)
There is an equivalent equation for red attrition with a coefficient '&' that is the rate blue
kills red. When these two equations are integrated and combined, the result is the square law
state or difference equation:
b(bluelitiol -blue2final ) = a(redfnitiaI -red2flml)
Normally the attrition rates and initial force sizes are input to find the final force sizes. The
ending ratio of strength is used to determine victory. For our purposes the state equation can be
rewritten as:
b
a

=

redfnitial-red2ftnal
bluefnitial -bluezfinal

This allows the unitless ratio, —, to reflect the relative advantage in attrition with numbers
a
greater than 1 favoring the blue. This ratio can be calculated with just the attrition data from the
model with no other information about the agents behavior nor parameters from the battle
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needed. This is the method by which the Lanchester laws are often 'fit' to an historical battle.
The ratio of 'fit' attrition coefficients can then be compared to the ratio of the predicted attrition
coeficients.
The attrition coefficient is composed of the rate of fire (p) and the single-shot probability
ofkill(SSPK):
b = p*(SSPK)

Linear Law
The linear law is typically used to model unaimed or indirect fire such as artillery. The
premise is that attrition is based on the number of targets as well as the number of shooters. The
basic equation is:
diblue)

d(time)

= -a * (red)JN*/LI
* (blue)N

The state law for the linear law is:
Hblueinitial-blue final) = a(redinitial-red final)

and the ratio of attrition coefficients is:
b _
a

rß

d initial ~red fi^

blueinilial -bluefmal

The attrition coefficients for the linear law are similar in form to those of the square law. The
only difference is that the probability of hit for any shot (PH/S) is a function of the percent of the
target area covered by the lethal radius of the (artillery) shell instead of direct weapon accuracy.
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Mixed Law
This law is used when one side (blue) uses aimed fire and the other (red) uses area fire. It is
often applied to an ambush situation where the victims are unsure of the location of the attackers.
The attrition coefficient ratio for this law is:
b

=

2*(redinitiaI-redfinal)

a

(blue?nitia!-blue2fma!)

Logarithmic Law
The logarithmic law is typically used to describe attrition due to factors other than combat. This
law models events like training losses and transportation accidents and is considered inapplicable
once combat begins [Hartman, p. 6-22.]. The 'log' law is described here, but not included in the
analysis because the OODA exploitation model does not have a mechanism for losses other than
enemy fire. The basic equation is a function of the pre-combat attrition rate and the force size:
d(blue)
= —a* (blue)
d(time)
The state equation for this law becomes:
b*ln

red.initial
blue initial
= a*ln
blue final
red final

Helmbold's Law
Helmbold modified the Lanchester equations to account for the fact that not all weapons
in a large battle can be brought to bear on all targets [Hartman, p. 6-23]. The basic form is:
blue
d(blue)
= —a*
d(time)
red
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(l-w)

*red

where "... w is a measure of the efficiency with which the large force can be brought to bear on a
smaller force" [Hartman, p. 6-23].
Helmbold's final formulation does not use typical attrition coefficients, but instead is
based on the following relationship:
LHELMRAT = a*LFORRAT + ß
The logarithmic Helmbold ratio (LHELMRAT) is defined as:
re

LHELMRAT = In

"inilia!

re<

* final

MuelitM -blue2final

and can be read directly from the "Square Law" curve in Figure 19. The logarithm of the initial
force ratio (LFORRAT) is zero in all but scenario 3. The term a describes which Lanchester
law, or mix thereof, provides a basis for the attrition of the battle. The ß term is used to describe
attrition influences other than direct combat, which could include morale, leadership skills,
weather, etc [Hartley, p463]. In scenarios 1, 2, and 4 the LFORRAT is zero meaning that all
attrition effects in the LHELMRAT come from the ß term. This would imply that a direct
attrition advantage from OODA exploitation is not described by Helmbold's formulation of the
Lanchester laws but instead by the other 'soft' factors.
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Model Output
An example of the output from the OODA exploitation model (from scenario 1, case 1) is shown
in Table 4. This data has been imported to a spreadsheet from its original tab delimited format.
Time Blue Red Blue at Red at Blue Red Blue Red
Goal Shots Shots Hits Hits
Alive Alive Goal

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
20
20
17
16
14
12
9
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

20
20
20
18
16
15
14
12
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

0
0
0
3
6
7
9
15
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

0
0
0
3
8
11
15
20
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24

0
0
0
2
4
5
6
8
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

Rep

0 Rep 1
0
0
3
4
6
8
11
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13

Table 4. Sample model output
Once all the model output data was imported into a spreadsheet, it was reorganized and used in
various calculations to produce the graphs presented in this thesis.
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Appendix B

Doctrine as seen through OODA
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Decision cycle warfare, or OODA exploitation, is aimed at the fundamental nature of war.
In this section each of the Principles of War and Tenets of Air and Space Power will be
briefly framed in the context of OODA exploitation. The doctrinal definition of each
principle of war and tenet of aerospace power from AFDD 1 is included for comparison
and clarification.

The Principles of War

The principles are independent—but tightly fused in application. No one principle should be
considered without due consideration of the others. These principles are not all-inclusive but provide a
basis for judgment in employing military forces. The art of developing air and space strategies depends
upon the airman's ability to view these principles from an aerial perspective and integrate their application
with the airman's fundamentals. The principles of war—combined with the additional fundamentals of air
and space power discussed later in this chapter—provide the basis for a sound and enduring doctrine for the
air and space forces of America's joint force.

If OODA exploitation is indeed relevant to each of these recognized concepts about the
nature of war then it may be the common thread that ties the Principles together. Then
again, the Principles may just be elements of OODA exploitation.

Unity of Command
A unified command can be represented as a single large OODA link at the top of
the web. This single link prevents subordinate links from being lengthened by a lack of
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coordination or direction in resources (observe), purpose (orient), training (decide and
act)
AFDD 1 Description:
Unity of command ensures the concentration of effort for every objective under one responsible
commander. This principle emphasizes that all efforts should be directed and coordinated toward a common
objective. Air and space power's theater wide perspective calls for unity of command to gain the most
efficient application. Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved by
vesting a single commander with the authority to direct all force employment in pursuit of a common
objective. The essence of successful operations is a coordinated and cooperative effort toward a commonly
understood objective. In many military operations other than war, the wide-ranging agency and nongovernmental operations involved may dilute unity of command; nevertheless, a unity of effort must be
preserved in order to ensure common focus and mutually supporting actions. Unity of command is
important for all forces, but it is vital in employing air and space forces. Air and space power is the product
of multiple capabilities, and centralized command and control (C2 ) is essential to effectively fuse these
capabilities. Airmen best understand the entire range of air and space power. Theater and global ranging
capabilities impose theater and global responsibilities, which can be discharged only through the integrating
function of centralized command under an airman. That is the essence of unity of command and air and
space power.

Objective

A clearly defined objective makes orientation easier and faster
AFDD 1 Description:
The principle of objective is concerned with directing military operations toward a defined and attainable
objective that contributes to strategic, operational, or tactical aims. In application, this principle refers to
unity of effort. Success in military operations demands that all efforts be directed toward the achievement of
common aims. In a broad sense, this principle holds that political and military goals should be
complementary and clearly articulated. A clear national military strategy provides focus for defining
campaign or theater objectives. At the operational level, campaign or theater objectives determine military
priorities. Importantly, particularly in peace support operations, the time and persistence required to attain
the objective must be clearly understood by all. The objective is important to all military forces, but it is
especially so in air, space, and information warfare due to the versatility of air and space forces. Unlike
surface forces, modern air and space forces do not normally need to sequentially achieve tactical objectives
first before pursuing operational or strategic objectives. From the outset, air and space forces can pursue
tactical, operational, or strategic objectives, in any combination, or all three simultaneously. From an
airman's perspective, then, the principle of the objective shapes priorities to allow air and space forces to
concentrate on theater or campaign priorities and seeks to avoid the siphoning of force elements to
fragmented objectives.
This principle is also one that has significant meaning to air warfare. Offensive is to act rather than
react and dictates the time, place, purpose, scope, intensity, and pace of operations. The initiative must be
seized as soon as possible. The principle of the offensive holds that offensive action, or initiative, pro-vides
the means for joint forces to dictate battle-space operations. Once seized, the initiative should be retained
and fully exploited. Air and space forces are best used as an offensive weapon. While defense may be
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dictated by the combat situation, success in war is generally attained only while on the offensive. This is
particularly true for air and space forces. Even highly successful defensive air campaigns such as the World
War II Battle of Britain were based upon selective offensive engagements rather than fragmenting into
small patrols everywhere. Air and space forces are inherently offensive at the tactical level, even when
employed in operational or strategic defense. Control of air and space is offensive in execution. History has
generally shown that a well-planned and executed air attack is extremely difficult to completely stop. The
speed and range of attacking air and space forces give them a significant offensive advantage over surface
forces and even over the defending air and space forces, since for air attack the defender often requires
more forces to defend a given surface area than the attacker requires to strike a set of specific targets.
Although all military forces have offensive capabilities, airpower's ability to mass and maneuver and its
ability to operate at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels of warfare—or to simultaneously operate at
all levels—provide JFCs a resource with global presence to directly and almost immediately seize the
initiative. Whether rapidly deploying forces and supplies into a region, conducting combat operations, or
providing information superiority over an enemy, air and space forces provide the JFC the means to take the
offensive. From the beginning of an operation, air forces can seize the initiative by attacking the enemy
directly by flying over enemy lines and flying around massed defenses. Through prompt and decisive
offensive actions designed to attain operational and strategic objectives, air and space forces cause the
enemy to react rather than act, deny the enemy the offensive, and shape the remainder of the conflict.

Mass

Mass is designed to produce a logistical surprise.
AFDD 1 Description:
The principle of mass calls for concentrating combat power at a decisive time and place. Concentration of
military power is a fundamental consideration in all military operations. At the operational level, this
principle suggests that superior, concentrated combat power is used to achieve decisive results. Generally,
surface forces must mass combat power before launching an attack, whereas airpower is singularly able to
launch an attack from widely dispersed locations and mass combat power at the objective. Moreover, from
an airman's perspective, mass is not based only on the quantity of forces and materiel committed. Mass is
an effect... not just overwhelming quantity. The speed, range, and flexibility of air forces—complemented
by the accuracy and lethality of precision weapons and advances in command, control, and information
gathering technologies— allow them to achieve mass faster than surface forces. Mass is an effect that air
and space forces achieve through efficiency of attack. Today's air and space forces have altered the concept
of massed forces. In the past, hundreds of airplanes attacked one or two major targets each day. Massed
bomber raids revisited targets often, intending their attacks to gradually attain cumulative operational- or
strategic-level effects over time. Today, a single precision weapon that is targeted using superior battlespace
awareness can often cause the destructive effect that in the past took hundreds of bombs. Emerging
information warfare (IW) capabilities also present new opportunities to attack critical targets. IW can, with
precision, stealth, and the speed of light, affect a variety of functions and capabilities. The airman's
perspective of mass must also include air-power's ability to assist in the massing of lethal and non-lethal
surface forces. Airlift provides a significant and critical capability to mass lethal and nonlethal forces on a
global scale. The rapid mobility of airlift enabled the airborne assault during Operation JUST CAUSE,
which played a pivotal role in massing US forces in Panama. The capability of air forces to act quickly and
mass effects, along with the capability to mass other lethal and nonlethal military power, combines the
principle of mass with the next principle—maneuver.
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Maneuver

Maneuver may be used to generate moral surprise and logistical surprise.
AFDD 1 Description:
The principle of maneuver calls for action to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the
flexible application of combat power. Air and space power's ability to conduct maneuver is not only a
product of its speed and range, but also flows from its flexibility and versatility during the planning and
execution of operations. Like the offensive, maneuver forces the enemy to react, allows the exploitation of
successful friendly operations, and reduces our vulnerabilities. The ability to integrate a force quickly and to
strike directly at an adversary's strategic or operational center of gravity (COG) is a key theme of air and
space power's maneuver advantage. Air maneuver allows engagement almost anywhere, from almost any
direction, thus forcing the adversary to be on guard everywhere. Additionally, the principle of maneuver is
not limited to simple weapons delivery. In 1994, during Operation Vigilant Warrior, airpower's global
awareness, global reach, and global presence was clearly demonstrated. Air Force air mobility forces
provided combat power to deter Iraqi movements into Kuwait. Whether it involves air mobility or attack
aircraft, in small or large numbers, the versatility and responsiveness of airpower allow the simultaneous
application of mass and maneuver. Air and space maneuver is uniquely able to achieve mass while moving
with unmatched agility. Maneuvering ground forces to achieve military mass has historically taken a
tremendous logistics effort and a great deal of time. Airpower, however, is extremely agile in providing
military mass. Whether considering the airlift over the Himalayan mountains in 1944, the Berlin airlift of
the late 1940s, airlift to Israel in 1973, or more recent operations such as SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda,
PROVIDE HOPE in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), or PROVIDE PROMISE in
Bosnia, airpower plays a critical role in American diplomacy by providing unmatched maneuverability. In
applying the principles of mass and maneuver, air planners must also consider a related principle, that of
economy of force.

Economy of Force

Economy of force allows the preservation of resources that can be used
offensively in parallel attacks or defensively to prevent logistical surprise.
AFDD 1 Description:
The economy of force principle calls for the rational use of force by selecting the best mix of combat power.
To ensure overwhelming combat power is available, minimal combat power should be devoted to secondary
objectives. At the operational level, this requires minimum effort be made towards secondary objectives
that do not support the larger operational or strategic objectives. This principle requires airmen to exercise
a broader operational view and requires clearly articulated objectives and priorities. Economy offeree may
require airpower in an area to attack, defend, delay, or conduct deception operations, depending on the
importance of the area or the priority of the objective or objectives. Although this principle suggests the
use of overwhelming force in one sense, it also recommends against "overkill" by guarding against
unnecessary force. This is particularly relevant in military operations other than war in which excessive
force can destroy the gaining or maintaining of legitimacy and support for an operation. Information
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operations conducted by air and space forces enable the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to have dominant
battlespace awareness in order to economically allocate forces for maximum effect. While this principle
was well developed before the advent of air-power, it responds precisely to the greatest vulnerability of air
and space power employment: the misuse or misdirection of air and space power, which can reduce its
contribution even more than enemy action. Ill-defined objectives can result in the piecemeal application of
air and space forces with the resultant loss of decisive effects.

Security

Offensive security operations help to achieve surprise while defensive security
operations are counter-surprise operations. If a combatant knows the enemy's intent, the
combatant can prepare and prevent OODA exploitation.
AFDD 1 Description:
The principle of security requires that friendly forces and their operations be protected from enemy action
that could provide the enemy with unexpected advantage. The lethal con-sequences of enemy air or space
attack make the security of friendly forces a paramount concern. This principle also enhances freedom of
action by reducing the vulnerability of friendly forces and creating opportunities to strike the enemy where
least expected. Gaining or maintaining control of the air, space, and information mediums pro-vides friendly
forces a significant advantage. Airpower is most vulnerable on the ground. Thus, air base defense is an
integral part of airpower deployments. Bases not only must withstand aerial and ground attacks, but also
must sustain concentrated and pro-longed air activities against the enemy. This must be a particular focus of
operations during peace support or crisis situations when forces operate from austere and unimproved
locations, in small units, or in crowded urban settings and face threats to security from individuals and
groups as well as possible military or paramilitary units. Importantly, security may be obtained by staying
beyond the enemy's reach. Air and space forces are uniquely suited to capitalize on this through their global
capabilities. Not only can they reach and strike at extended range, but they can also distribute data and
analysis as well as command and control across a worldwide span. Security from enemy intrusion conceals
friendly capabilities and intentions while allowing our forces the freedom to gather information on the
adversary. Critical to security is the understanding that air; and space power is no longer just aircraft,
missiles, and satellites but information warfare tools as well. Thus security embraces not only physical
security, but also security of the information medium. Information has always been part of air, land, and sea
warfare; now, with the proliferation of information technologies, it has become even more central to the
outcome of a conflict. The instantaneous global reach of modern information systems is as vital to the Air
Force's strategic perspective as any air or space weapon. Today, advanced microchips and communications
allow the concept of information superiority to be a strategic component of warfare. Precise strategic attacks
delivered against Iraq's central command and control structure during DESERT STORM validated this
concept. Additionally, information technology can directly or indirectly affect national or group leadership,
population, and infrastructure, bypassing direct military confrontation. Now, whoever has the best ability to
gain, defend, exploit, and attack information, and deny the same capabilities to an opponent, has a distinct
strategic advantage. By blinding the Iraqi leadership, air and space power allowed ground forces to move
undetected to a point where the Iraqi army was least prepared to deal with a massive attack. Space-based
and air-breathing ISR systems allowed the coalition command to direct air strikes against Iraqi troops
moving south to assist in the battle of Khafji. Because the Iraqis lacked security, their troops were destroyed
long before they reached their objective.
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Surprise

OODA exploitation is synonymous with surprise.
AFDD 1 Description:
Surprise leverages the security principle by attacking at a time, place, or in a manner for which the enemy is
not prepared. The speed and range of air and space forces, coupled with their flexibility and versatility,
allow air forces to achieve surprise more readily than surface forces. Air- and space-based ISR systems
enhance the ability to achieve surprise by providing information superiority. The choice of time and place
of assault rests with the commander of air and space forces because terrain and distance are not inhibiting
factors in the air and space environment. Historically, armies arid navies massed large numbers of troops or
ships to create significant impact on the enemy. Today, the technology impact of precision guided
munitions enables a relatively small number of aircraft to achieve national- or theater-level objectives.
When combined with stealth and information technologies, air and space forces today can provide shock
and surprise without unnecessarily exposing massed friendly forces. Surprise is one of air and space
power's strongest advantages. On 11 November 1940, Admiral Andrew Cunningham delivered a crushing
air attack from the HMS Illustrious on the Italian naval base of Taranto. While the British lost 2 of 21
attacking aircraft, they left 3 battleships in sinking condition, badly damaged 2 cruisers, and sank 2 fleet
auxiliaries. This attack may have inspired the successful Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor over one year
later. The 1986 surprise raid against Libya persuaded Muammar Qadhafi to change his policy of open
support of worldwide terrorism. In 1990, Saddam Hussein believed he had nothing to fear from the United
States Air Force. What he failed to consider was the global presence of air and space forces. Airlift and air
refueling provided global reach, while combat aircraft provided strategic power. When the first explosions
rocked downtown Baghdad, the ability of modern airpower to strike without warning, and with great
accuracy, proved the Iraqi dictator wrong. Saddam Hussein grossly misjudged the power of an integrated
air attack. He saw firsthand the principle of surprise in practice. Air and space forces can enhance and
empower surface forces to achieve surprise. The rapid global reach of airpower also allows surface forces to
reach foreign destinations quickly, thus seizing the initiative through surprise. Air and space power allowed
the coalition to achieve an overwhelming surprise and also ensured the coalition forces themselves would
not become victims of surprise.

Simplicity

Complex plans and operations have more parameters and variables to track and
have more contingencies to filter in the orientation phase. These extra parameters clog
and slow the OODA process. A simple plan is more likely to yield a shorter OODA loop.
AFDD 1 Description:
The final principle, simplicity, calls for avoiding unnecessary complexity in organizing, preparing,
planning, and conducting military operations. This ensures that guidance, plans, and orders are as
simple and direct as the objective will allow. Simple guidance allows subordinate commanders the
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freedom to creatively operate within their battlespace. Military operations, especially joint operations,
are often complex. Common equipment, a common understanding of Service and joint doctrine, and
familiarity with procedures through joint exercises and training can help overcome complexity, but
straightforward plans and unambiguous organizational and command relationships are central to
reducing it. The premise that airmen work for airmen and that the senior airman (the commander of Air
Force forces) works for the JFC is central to simplicity.

Tenets of Air and Space Power
Air and space power is intrinsically different from either land or sea power, and its employment must be
guided by axioms different than those of surface forces. Both the air and space mediums involve operations
in three dimensions. While airpower is primarily affected by aerodynamics, space power is guided by the
principles of orbital mechanics and is not limited by the vertical extent of the atmosphere. Both share the
advantages of three-dimensional maneuver such as the overlook of enemy positions and the ability to
maneuver beyond enemy surface forces, and both are inextricably linked by warfighting principles. The
fundamental guiding truths of air and space power employment are known as tenets, which in addition to the
principles of war, should be under-stood by every airman. They reflect not only the unique historical and
doctrinal evolution of airpower but the specific current under-standing of the nature of air, space, and,
increasingly, information power. The tenets of airpower complement the principles of war. While the
principles of war provide general guidance on the application of air and space forces, the tenets provide
more specific considerations for air and space forces. They reflect the specific lessons of air and space
operations over the history of powered flight and highlight the way integrated air and space forces differ
from surface forces in providing global strategic air and space power. As with the principles of war, these
tenets require informed judgment in application. They require a skillful blending to tailor them to the everchanging operational environment. The seemingly conflicting demands of the principles and tenets,
especially the demands of mass, economy of force, concentration, and priority, require an airman's expert
understanding in order to strike the required balance. No two operations are alike; therefore, in the last
analysis, the commander must accept the fact that war is incredibly complicated. The application of the
principles and tenets must be left to commanders and their professional knowledge and experience as they
strive to craft the most effective employment of air and space power for a given situation [AFDD 1].

Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution

This tenet is the blueprint for building an effective OODA web. The big links at
top influence and coordinate the links at the bottom, but are isolated from the details and
risks of battle.
AFDD 1 Description:
Centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space forces are critical to force effectiveness.
Air and space power must be controlled by an airman who maintains a broad strategic and/or theater
perspective in prioritizing the use of limited air and space assets to attain the objectives of all US forces in
any contingency across the range of operations. During the initial engagements of World War II and
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through the entire Vietnam conflict, command of US airpower was fragmented and controlled by competing
commanders. The results taught airpower leaders that centralized control was the best way to effectively
employ airpower. The outcome of the Gulf War stands in stark contrast to that of Vietnam.
The lesson is clear: attempts to fragment the control and planning of air and space power will
ultimately cost blood and treasure by diverting effort and impact. Centralized control allows commanders to
focus on those priorities that lead to victory. Through centralized control, commanders give coherence,
guidance, and organization to the air and space effort and maintain the ability to focus the tremendous
impact of air and space power wherever needed across the theater of operations. Just as central to the proper
application of airpower is the concept of decentralized execution. Delegation of execution authority to
responsible and capable lower-level commanders is essential to achieve effective span of control and to
foster initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility. Centralized control and decentralized
execution were illustrated by the 2,000-3,000 sorties a day in the Gulf War. The single command intent of
the JFC was centrally planned and then distributed and executed across an entire theater battlespace by over
500 flight leads; mission, crew, and flight commanders; and support teams in a continuous application
against an entire range of separately engaging, thinking, reacting enemies.

Flexibility and Versatility

The duration of time in which an OODA is vulnerable is limited. These tenets are
essential to the ability to exploit an OODA once it has been target while it is still
vulnerable.
AFDD 1 Description:
Air and space power is flexible and versatile. Although often used inter changeably, flexibility and
versatility are distinct in meaning. Flexibility allows air and space forces to exploit mass and maneuver
simultaneously to a far greater extent than surface forces. At the operational level, flexibility allows air
operations to shift from one campaign objective to another, quickly and decisively. The A-10, usually
considered a close air support aircraft, took on many interdiction missions during DESERT STORM, while
one wing of F-llls, optimized as long-range, deep-interdiction aircraft, destroyed hundreds of tanks and
armored fighting vehicles with precision weapons. During the Vietnam conflict, B-52 heavy bombers
provided highly effective support as close as 1,000 yards from the Marines defending Khe Sanh. Versatility
in air and space power stems from the fact that it can be employed equally effectively at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels of warfare. Unlike other forms of military power, air and space forces have
the versatility to be employed globally with unmatched responsiveness in support of strategic, operational,
or tactical objectives and can simultaneously achieve objectives at all three levels of war—in parallel
operations. Air and space attacks can be simultaneous and continuous against a broad spectrum of targets
and with sufficient force to overwhelm the enemy. The versatility of air and space power, properly
executed in parallel attacks, can attain parallel effects which pre-sent the enemy with multiple crises
occurring so quickly that there is no way to respond to all or, in some cases, any of them. Such a strategy
places maximum stress on both enemy defenses and the enemy society as a whole. Parallel operations can
be conducted at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war and either symmetrically against the
adversary's air and space forces or asymmetrically against the enemy's surface forces—often
simultaneously. Parallel force-application theory is not new, but its recent emphasis is essentially a product
of the efficiency of high technology precision weapons, command and control techniques, ISR systems, and
the resultant synergistic application. For parallel strategic operations, the swift, massive, and precise
application of air, space, and information power against several critical COGs may be sufficient to produce
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shock and may result in organizational paralysis that provides the leverage to dominate surface as well as air
and space operations.

Svnergistic Effects

The disruption of the OODA associated with the physical destruction of a target
can negate enemy plans and effect future decisions. This influence on future events is the
synergistic effect.
AFDD 1 Description:
Air and space forces produce synergistic effects. The proper application of a coordinated force can
produce effects that exceed the individual contributions of the individual forces employed separately. The
destruction of a large number of targets through attrition warfare is rarely the key objective in modern war.
Instead, it is the precise, coordinated application of the various elements of air, space, and surface forces
which brings disproportionate pressure on enemy leaders to comply with our national will. Our
overwhelming ability to observe our adversaries allows us to counter their movements with unprecedented
speed and agility. Air and space power is unique in its ability to accomplish this and thus dictate the tempo
and direction of an entire warfighting effort from MOOTW operations through major conflict.

Persistence

Persistence in attack ensures that an impaired OODA cannot recover and may lead
to collapse.
AFDD 1 Description:
Air and space systems are uniquely suited to persistent operations. Persistence suggests continued efforts.
Unlike surface power, air and space power's inherent exceptional speed and range allows its forces to visit
and revisit wide ranges of targets nearly at will. Air and space power does not have to occupy terrain or
remain constantly in proximity to areas of operation to bring force upon them. Space forces in particular
hold the ultimate high ground, and as space systems advance and proliferate, they offer the potential for
"permanent presence" over any part of the globe. The goal of persistent operations may be to maintain a
continuous flow of materiel to peacetime distressed areas; surveil adversaries constantly to ensure they
cannot conduct actions against our wishes; assure targets are kept continually out of commission; or ensure
that resources and facilities are denied to an enemy or provided to an ally during a defined time. The end
result would be to deny the opponent an opportunity to seize the initiative and allow friendly forces to
directly accomplish their assigned tasks. Persistence is a critical element in ensuring the prolonged effect of
air, space, and information operations. It is the intention of most modern air and space operations to quickly
attain objectives through swift, parallel, and decisive blows to the adversary's operational and strategic
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COGs. However, on some occasions, factors such as enemy resilience, effective defenses, or environmental
concerns prevent this from happening. Realizing that for many situations, air and space operations provide
the most efficient and effective means to attain national objectives, commanders must persist in air and space
operations and resist pressures to divert resources to other efforts unless such diversions are vital to attaining
theater goals or to survival of an element of the joint force. Given sufficient time, even the most devastating
strategic effects can be circumvented by resourceful enemies; the goal is to keep pressure on and not allow
the enemy that time.

Concentration

Concentration represents air power's ability to apply adequate stress on an OODA
to stretch or break the link.
AFDD 1 Description:
Air and space operations must achieve concentration of purpose. The very versatility of air and space
power makes it attractive in almost every combat task. Airmen must guard against the inadvertent
dispersion of air and space power effects resulting from high demand. One of the most constant and
important trends throughout military history has been the effort to concentrate overwhelming power at the
decisive time and place. The principles of mass and economy of force deal directly with concentrating
overwhelming power at the right time and the right place (or places). With forces as flexible and versatile
as air and space power, the demand for them will often exceed the available forces, and may result in the
fragmentation of the integrated air and space effort in attempts to fulfill the many demands of the operation.
Depending on the operational situation, such a course of action may court the triple risk of (1) failing to
achieve operational-level objectives, (2) delaying or diminishing the attainment of decisive effects, and (3)
increasing the attrition rate of air forces consequently, risking defeat in detail. Importantly, concentration of
purpose must not confuse "mass" with "purpose." A vital concept of air and space forces is its inherent
ability to accomplish simultaneous strategic, operational, and tactical effects—to conduct parallel
operations—and attain over-whelming effect (concentration of purpose) through carefully dispersed
applications.

Priority

Since all entities in an enemy system have an OODA loop, those loops that will
have the greatest impact on the enemy web must be targeted first. The rest of the system
may become ineffective after collapsing these COG loops and the enemy may submit to
our political will.
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AFDD 1 Description:
Air and space operations must be prioritized. Given their flexibility and versatility, demands for air and
space forces will likely swamp air commanders in future conflicts unless appropriate priorities are
established. Only theater-level commanders of land and naval components can effectively prioritize their
individual air component support requirements to the joint force commander, and only then can effective
priorities for the use of air and space forces flow from an informed dialogue between the JFC and the air
component commander. The air commander should assess the possible uses of air and space forces and
their strengths and capabilities to support (1) the overall joint campaign, (2) air operations, and (3) the
battle at hand. Limited resources require that air and space forces be applied where they can make the
greatest contribution to the most critical current JFC requirements. The inherent strategic application of air
and space forces must be balanced against their ability to conduct operations at all levels of war, often
simultaneously. The principles of mass, offensive, and economy of force, the tenet of concentration, and
the airman's strategic perspective all apply to prioritizing air and space force operations.

Balance

Critical OODA loops can be found at all levels in the OODA web. Fixating on a
specific type of mission or target set will not usually cover the most critical or vulnerable
enemy OODAs while maintaining our OODAs in tact.
AFDD 1 Description:
Air and space operations must be balanced. Balance is an essential guideline for air commanders. Much of
the skill of an air commander is reflected in the dynamic and correct balancing of the principles of war and
the tenets of airpower to bring air and space power together to produce a synergistic effect. An air
commander should balance combat opportunity, necessity, effectiveness, efficiency, and the impact on
accomplishing assigned objectives against the associated risk to friendly air and space forces. An air
commander is uniquely—and best—suited to determine the proper theater wide balance between offensive
and defensive operations, and among strategic, operational, and tactical applications. Technologically
sophisticated air and space assets will be available only in finite numbers; thus, balance is a crucial
determinant for an air commander.
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Appendix C

The Model
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Technical Administrative Information
This program was written using Semantics' Visual Cafe Professional Development version 2.5.
JDK 1.1.6 was also used. All of the data runs were done in appletviewer through Visual Cafe on
a 200MHz PC. The program will run in a browser (IE 4.0) if the Executive.printout switch is set
to false.
Model Operation
The model is not difficult to set up or run, but it is not convenient either. The parameters
for the model must be entered into the code and recompiled before running the simulation. The
good news is that almost all the parameters that need to be changed on a run by run basis are in
either the Executive class (simulation parameters) or TAgentAttributes class (for agent
parameters). These parameters are well documented and easy to find in the code, usually at the
beginning. The Executive class is the applet. It controls the rest of the simulation by controlling
the graphics, holding input variables, printing output, and instantiating a series (loop) of manager
classes. A different Manager class is established to control each case and performs a loop of
iterations of that same case. Its purpose is to load and initialize the agents, collect statistics, and
terminate the run. 30 iterations of each case were run for statistical purposes. The bulk of the
program is the TAgent class. This class holds the OODA loop and personalities of each
individual agents. The TAgents' parameters are set with the class TAgentAttributes. The
observation class is used by the TAgents to hold the information needed about the other agents
they can 'see'. The BattleGround class holds the methods to draw the graphics.
Lessons on Multi-threading
One aspect of multi-threading is that the threads do not actually run simultaneously. Each
thread is allotted a timeshare on the CPU, but only one thread at a time is actually active. The
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TAgent class threads all have the same priority so the computer picks which of the threads to
execute first. Other threads on the computer, such as the operating system, screen savers, etc.,
also compete for CPU time. This means the simulation will run differently on machines with
different CPU speeds and different software.
Another important point is that the agents are not entirely independent. To keep the
multithreading from overtasking (locking up) the simulation, the agents are put into a sequence
once per OODA to help the simulation determine which thread has precedence (for the CPU
time). This is accomplished by making the decide method a synchronized method. This means
that only one thread (TAgent) at a time can use this method. The effect is that the agents decide
(and delay), act, observe, orient, and then wait in line to get access to the decide method again.
This does dampen the system slightly, but does not force an order or sequence on the agents as
the queue for the decide method is first-come-first-serve and based on the speed of the agents'
previous OODA.
Planned modifications
If I had more time these are the changes I would make to the model. I don't believe any
are that difficult, just time consuming.
1. Build a GUI to initialize the battle and modify the parameters on the fly
2. Display battle results someplace in applet so they can be seen in a browser.
3. Put in a weapon reload time (in TAgent.act or TAgent.shoot) to prevent simultaneous
shooting at multiple targets.
4. Debug the last two straggling agents that just can't get into the goal. Check to see if
this is because of a condition with the advance switch (if < unitsize and no enemies).
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Source code for Executive class
// Major Tom Tighe's Air Force Institute of Technology Thesis Project
// last revised on 29 Jan 1998
import
import
import
import
import

Java.applet.*;
java.awt.*;
java.io.*;
j ava.lang.*;
java.util.*;

/** The Executive class runs the simulation. It is responsible for overseeing the graphics,
stepping through the iterative runs, taking the user input variables dealing with the scope
and nature of the battle, and writing output to a file (in appletviewer). The vitual machine
creates an instance of this class and calls it's init( ) method using a thread created by the
virtual machine. This thread starts an Executive thread called "boss" that oversees the
remainder of the simulation. The program's multithreading starts in the Manager class which
is also controlled by the boss thread.

*/
public class Executive extends Applet implements Runnable
/**

The first thread of execution that the program creates.
the remainder of the simulation*/
public static Thread boss;

It will oversee

/** The playing field */
static BattleGround field;
/** The top of the screen */
Panel north;
/** The center of the screen */
Panel center;
/** The title caption */
Label caption;
/** An instance of the class Manager that will control one repetition*/
static Manager VP;
/** a vector of dataPoints */
public Vector data;
/** An iteration counter for the repetitions to be run in a case of the simulation*/
static int rep = 0;
/** This will generate common random numbers for weapons effectiveness (kills) */
static Random randomGenerator;
/** An iteration counter for the number of cases to be run in the simulation */
static int caseCount = 0;
/** This switch will prevent a "null pointer exception in battlefield.paint()during
initialization*/
static boolean drawTAgents = false;
// These are the variables needed to initialize the forces ================================
/** This switch will write output to a file in the same directory that the
executive class is in. This does not work if the simulation is run from a
web browser. Use appletviewer to run the simulation if you want output*/
static boolean printout = true;
/** This switch will use common random numbers for each case*/
static boolean randomSeed = true;
/** Time limit of simulation in seconds */
static int timelimit = 20;
/** Number of repetitions per case*/
static int repetitions = 30;
/** The number of cases to be performed in the simulation*/
static int cases = 17;
/** This value will be used to seed the common random number generator if "randomSeed =
true"*/
static long seedValue = 252;
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// The following variables are required to initialize the simulation ++++++++++++++++++++++++
/** This is the initial force size of the blue side */
static int numberOfBlue = 20;
/** This is the initial force size of the red side */
static int numberOfRed = 40;
/** This sets the number of TAgents per row of the initial formation of blue TAgents */
static int blueSquadSize = 5;
/** This sets the number of TAgents per row of the initial formation of red TAgents */
static int redSquadSize = 5;
/** The predefined TAgentAttribute used to initialize the blue force*/
static int bluePersonality = 0;
/** The predefined TAgentAttribute used to initialize the red force. It is adjusted
iteritively in the run method of this class to step through multiple cases each with a
different red personality defined in TAgentAttributes*/
static int redPersonality = 1;
// end of user required inputs ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
/**

The X cartesian coordinate of the door to the blue base */
static int blueBaseX = 12,/** The Y cartesian coordinate of the door to the blue base */
static int blueBaseY = 12;
/** The X cartesian coordinate of the door to the red base */
static int redBaseX = 388;
/** The Y cartesian coordinate of the door to the red base */
static int redBaseY = 288;
/** This controls the dimensions of the graphic (square)for the TAgents' bases*/
static int baseSize = 10;
/** This is the instance of the class TAgent Attributes used to initialize the blue force*/
static TAgentAttributes blueAttributes;
/** This is the instance of the class TAgent Attributes used to initialize the red force*/
static TAgentAttributes redAttributes;
/** This string is the name of the output file*/
static String outFileName;
/** dataOut is the output stream that writes the "dataPoints" to a file*/
static FileOutputStream dataOut = null;

// METHODS $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
/** The init( ) method sets up the applet graphical output. The init( ) method executes on
the thread designated by the JAVA vitual machine, not one you've created. After
executing the init( ) method, that thread returns and then invokes the start( ) method.

*/
public void init( ) {
setLayout(new BorderLayout() ) ;
setBackground(Color.white);
north = new Panel();
north.setLayout(new FlowLayout() ) ;
caption = new Label("An Experiment in OODA Advantage");
north.add(caption);
center = new Panel();
center.setLayout(new FlowLayout());
field = new BattleGround();
field.init(this);
center.add(field);
add(north, BorderLayout.NORTH);
addicenter, BorderLayout.CENTER);
} // end initO
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/** This method starts a thread of execution called "boss" to control the simulation.
Like init( ), this method is executed by the thread designated by the virtual
machine. Once, this method is done executing, the thread created by the virtual
machine is done. Instead of using that thread, you'll create a new thread called boss,
"boss" executes the Executive's run( ) method which will, in turn, create
intances of other classes that will execute their run( ) method (Manager, TAgent)
on their own threads. The "boss" thread is done as soon as it's run( ) method
completes executing.

*/
public void start(){
boss = new Thread (this) ,boss.setPriority(Thread.MAX_PRIORITY);
boss.start ();
System.out.println( "\nAll done with the thread the virtual machine created to
instantiate Executive and execute its init( ) and start( ) methods.\n" ) ;
} // End of start()
/** This method is what the "boss" thread created in the Executive's start( ) method does.
You passed to the Thread's constructor, the instance of Executive originally created
by the virtual machine. Consequently, it's that same instance of Executive
executing the run( ) method but doing it on a new/different thread of execution than
was used to execute the init( ) and start( ) methods.

*/
public void run( ){
randomGenerator = new Random(seedValue);
//

This loop runs the specified number of cases
for (int c = 0; c < cases; c++){
rep = 0;
caseCount = c;
blueAttributes = new TAgentAttributes(bluePersonality);
redAttributes = new TAgentAttributes(redPersonality);
randomGenerator.setSeed(seedValue);

//

This will initialize the output file for each case
if (printout == true){
outFileName = new String("TigheB" + bluePersonality + "R"+ redPersonality +".out");
try { dataOut = new FileOutputStream (outFileName);}
catch (IOException e){System.out.println(" Error opening " + outFileName+"\n");}
String header = new
String("Time\tBLive\tRLive\tBGoal\tRGoal\tBShot\tRShot\tBhit\tRHit\tRep");
PrintStream ExecPS = new PrintStream (dataOut);
ExecPS.println (header);
}
// This will run the specified number of repetitions in each case
System.out.println( "\nStarting Case" + (c+1));
for (int r = 0; r < repetitions; r++) {
rep ++;
VP = new Manager();
VP.setPriority(Thread.MAX_PRIORITY);
drawTAgents = true;
VP.run();
while (VP.finished == false){}
VP.stopO ;
}
redPersonality+=l;
// updates the red's TAgentAttribute to be used in the next case
}
Label endCaption = new Label("All done");//adds a label when the simulation is complete
north.add(endCaption);
field.repaint();
} // End of run() =====================================================================
/** This method returns a random number used to determine the result of a TAgents shot*/
static double getRandom(){
if (randomSeed == true){return randomGenerator.nextDouble();} // Common random numbers
else {return Math.random();} // Just random numbers
} // End of getRandomO =================================================================
}// End of Executive Class

mmmmininininmimriimimrimmmimmmmiTunm^
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Source code for Manager class
// Major Tom Tighe's Air Force Institute of Technology Thesis Project

//
// last revised on 29 Jan 1999
import j ava.io.*;
import java.awt.*;
import java.util.*;
import j ava.lang.*;
/** The Manager class controls one repetition of the simulation. Manager reads the values
it needs to initialize the repetition directly from the Executive variables of the same name.
The Executive class creates an instance of this class for each repetition.

*/
public class Manager extends Thread {
//VARIABLES
/**

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$?$$$$$$$$$$$$$?$$$$$$$$$

A vector of all the TAgents involved in this repetition*/
static Vector v;

/** A vector of dataPoints. This is to be used to collect and compute statistics, but this
has not yet been implemented*/
public Vector data;
/** This is a switch that will shut the simulation down when the time limit expires */
public boolean finished = false;
//

These are statistic counters
static int totalBlueShots = 0;
static int totalBlueHits = 0;
static int totalRedShots = 0;
static int totalRedHits = 0;

// These are the variables needed to initialize the forces and are read directly from Executive
int timelimit = Executive.timelimit;
int repetitions = Executive.repetitions;
int
int
int
int
int
int

numberOfBlue = Executive.numberOfBlue;
numberOfRed = Executive.numberOfRed;
blueSquadSize = Executive.blueSquadSize,redSquadSize = Executive.redSquadSize;
bluePersonality = Executive.bluePersonality;
redPersonality = Executive.redPersonality;

int
int
int
int
int

blueBaseX = Executive.blueBaseX;
blueBaseY = Executive.blueBaseY;
redBaseX = Executive.redBaseX;
redBaseY = Executive.redBaseY;
baseSize = Executive.baseSize;

public TA'gentAttributes blueAttributes = Executive.blueAttributes;
public TAgentAttributes redAttributes = Executive.redAttributes;
// CONSTRUCTOR $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
/** The only constructor is this default constructor */
public Manager(){}
// METHODS $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
/**

This method initializes, runs, times, and shuts down the simulation*/
public void run( ){
System.out.printlnl" Manager is starting case "+Executive.caseCount+", rep "+Executive.rep);

int totalCombatants = (numberOfBlue + numberOfRed);
v = new Vector(totalCombatants); // This vector will hold all the TAgents in the
simulation
// This is where the Agent threads are created and stuffed into the vector "v"
for (int i = 0; i < totalCombatants; ++i) {
TAgent temp;
// This instantiates each TAgent and alternates the type in position in "v"
if (i/2 < numberOfRed && i/2 < numberOfBlue){
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(blue/red)

if ((i%2) == 0){temp = new TAgent(i, 0, blueSquadSize, numberOfRed,
blueAttributes);}
else {temp = new TAgent(i, 1, redSquadSize, numberOfBlue, redAttributes);}
}
// This handles the type and loading of 'V if the force size is asymmetric
else if (i/2 >= numberOfRed) {
temp = new TAgentd, 0, blueSquadSize, numberOfRed, blueAttributes);
}
else if (i/2 >= numberOfBlue) {
temp = new TAgent(i, 1, redSquadSize, numberOfBlue, redAttributes);
}
// This will catch any leftovers to complete the logic requirements
else {temp = new TAgent(i);}
// Set the TAgent threads to the lowest priority so Manager will be able to control them
temp.setPriority( 1 );
v.addElement(temp);
Executive.field.repaint();

I
II Reset the statistic counters
totalBlueShots = 0;
totalBlueHits = 0;
totalRedShots = 0;
totalRedHits = 0;
// This will begin the TAgent threads running now that they have been initialized
for (int k =0; k < v.sizeO; k++) {
((TAgent)v.elementAt(k)).start) );
}
int j = 0;
// This iteration variable is a clock to limit run time
data = new Vector(timelimit);
// This is for stats collection and has not been
implemented yet
String header = new String{"Time \t BA \t RA \t BG \t RG \t BS \t RS \t BH \t RH for REP
"+Executive.rep +"\n");
//
System.out.println(header) ,//Prints header to dos prompt
// Instantiate the printstream for data output
PrintStream ps = new Printstream (Executive.dataOut);
/** This has the Manager's thread wake up every second to time the simulation,
collect data and repaint */
c
while( j < timelimit ){
Executive.field.repaint( );
if (v.sizeO > 0) {
dataPoint tempData = new dataPoint () ,tempData.zero();
for (int i = 0; i < v.sizeO; ++i) {
tempData.addData((TAgent)v.elementAt(i));
}
data.insertElementAt(tempData, j); // This is for the future statistics computations
String dataLine = new String (j + "\t"+((dataPoint)(data.elementAt(j))).blueAlive
+"\t"+ ((dataPoint)(data.elementAt(j))).redAlive +
"\t"+((dataPoint)(data.elementAt(j))).blueAtGoal +"\t"+
((dataPoint)(data.elementAt(j))).redAtGoal +"\t"+ totalBlueShots +"\t"+ totalRedShots +"\t"+
totalBlueHits +"\t"+ totalRedHits );
if (j==o){ dataLine = (dataLine + "\tRep "+Executive.rep);} // This adds a marker to
the first rep of a run
//

System.out.println(dataLine);
// prints data (dataLine) to the dos prompt
if (Executive.printout == true){ps.println (dataLine);}
}
try {sleep(lOOO);}

// This sleeps the Manager's thread for one second, giving the

clock effect
catch (InterruptedException e){}
} // end of "J-loop"
// This kills each TAgent at the end of the timeLimit
for ( int k=0; k < v.size( ); ++k ) {
((TAgent)(v.elementAt(k))).notDone = false;
}
//

This will clear the screen for 2 seconds, then terminate the Manager's thread
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System.out.println("END SCORE "+ ((dataPoint)(data.elementAt(j-1))).blueAlive +" to "+
((dataPoint)(data.elementAt(j-1))).redAlive );
Executive.field.repaint();
try{sleep(2000);}
catch(InterruptedException e){}
finished = true;
} // End of run()==============================================================================
}// End of Manager Class mmmmmrrairararamimmiiranraramramrimmmnuimmirrim^

Source code for BattleGround class
// Major Tom Tighe's Air Force Institute of Technology Thesis Project

//
// last revised on 29 Jan 1999
import java.awt.*;
/** The battleground class is responsible for presenting all the graphics.
the center panel in Executive's "boarder layout"

It is initialized to

*/
public class BattleGround extends Canvas{
// VARIABLES $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
// METHODS $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
/**

This will initialize the battleGround for use in the Executive */
public void init(Executive app)
{
resize(400,300) ;
setBackground(Color.lightGray);
setForeground(Color.green);
}// End of mit()==============================================================

/** This will draw all the TAgents by invoking the TAgent's draw() method.
red and blue bases. */
public void paint(Graphics g){

It also draws the

int baseSize = Executive.baseSize;
// draw each TAgent
if (Executive.drawTAgents == true){
for (int i =0;i < Executive.VP.v.size(); i++){
TAgent pilot;
pilot = (TAgent)Executive.VP.v.elementAt(i);
if (pilot.notDone){
pilot.Draw(g);
}
}
}
// draw the bases
g.setColor(Color.blue);
g. fillRect (Executive.blueBaseX, Executive.blueBaseY, baseSize,baseSize) ,g.setColor(Color.red);
g.fillRect(Executive.redBaseX-baseSize, Executive.redBaseY-baseSize,baseSize,baseSize);
} // End of paint()
/** battleGroundlnit( ) is a placeholder for control initialization.
You should call this function from a constructor or initialization function if needed */
void battleGroundlnit0 {
System.out.printlnt"Battleground Testl");
} // End of battleGroundlnit ================================================
}// End of BattleGround

101

Source code for TAgent class
// Major Tom Tighe's Air Force Institute of Technology Thesis Project

//
// last revised on 01 Feb 1999
import j ava.awt.*;
import j ava.lang.*;
import java.util.*;
©author Thomas R. Tighe
The TAgent or "Thread Agent" class is the autonomous agent. Each TAgent is a
separate thread or program that runs independently of the other TAgents. This
class contains all the behavior rules and most of the variables needed for the
agents to work. The main function of the TAgent is to perform sequential OODA
loops in a combat decision environment. The key to exploring OODA loop
exploitation lies in the ability to pause or "sleep" each agent for a specified
and changeable time period. This quantifies the time the agent spends on each
OODA loop and allows the results of direct competition between agents with
different length decision cycles to be studied.
These agents are called and monitored by the Manager class which is called
and monitored by the Executive class.

*/
public class TAgent extends Thread

{

// CLASS VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
// Trait variables specific to this agent
/** This thread's position in the vector of TAgents in Executive */
public int id;
/** This is the side or team of this Agent (Blue or Red)*/
public int type;
/** This sets the fill color of this agent that marks side and alive or dead*/
Color inColor;
/** This sets the border color of this agent to mark if the agent has made the goal*/
Color outColor;
//Cartesian coordinate variables

:

/** The old X position*/
int xold;
/** The old Y position*/
int yold;
/** The current X position*/
int xnew;
/** The current Y position */
int ynew;
/** The calculated change in the X direction to move on this turn */
float deltaX;
/** The calculated change in the Y direction to move on this turn */
float deltaY;
/** The calculated adjustment in the X direction to keep from stepping on other agents*/
float delX;
/** The calculated adjustment in the Y direction to keep from stepping on other agents*/
float delY;
/** The X coordinate of the enemy base*/
int goalX;
/** The Y coordinate of the enemy base*/
int goalY;
/** The X coordinate of the agent's base*/
int baseX;
/** The Y coordinate of the agent's base*/
int baseY;
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/** The X coordinate of the target agent*/
int targetX;
/** The Y coordinate of the target agent*/
int targetY;
/** A temp variable for computing threat center of mass*/
int myThreatX;
/** A temp variable for computing threat center of mass*/
int myThreatY;
/** The X coordinate of the threat's center of mass*/
int myThreatCgX;
/** The Y coordinate of the threat's center of mass*/
int myThreatCgY;
/** A temporary variable for computing friendly center of mass*/
int myFriendsX;
/** A temporary variable for computing friendly center of mass*/
int myFriendsY;
/** The X coordinate of observed friendlies' center of mass*/
int myFriendsCgX;
/** The Y coordinate of observed friendlies' center of mass*/
int myFriendsCgY;
// Individual personality trait variables
/** The length of delay in the decision cycle*/
public int sleepTime;
/** How many hits until this agent dies*/
public int health = 3;
/** The single shot probability of kill at best range*/
public double pk = .7;
/** The max number of enemy of which the agent can keep aware*/
public int SA = 3;
/** The largest step an agent can take in one turn*/
public int maxSpeed = 20;
/** The personality weight to advance to goal*/
public int IAdvance = 2;
/** The personality weight to attack if favorable force ratio */
public int IAttack = 6;
/** The personality weight to regroup if unit gets too small*/
public int IRegroup = 4;
/** The personality weight to defend base if called*/
public int IDefend = 5;
/** The personality weight to avoid enemy if not attacking*/
public int IAvoidEnemy = 1;
/** The personality weight to maintain spacing if unit size is OK*/
public int IAvoidFriendlies = 1;
/** The personality weight to avoid base if not under attack*/
public int IAvoidBase = 1;
// Doctrinal personality trait variables
/** This is this side's visual or sensor range*/
public int sensorRange = 50;
/** This is this side's max weapons range*/
public int weaponsRange = 40;
/** This is this side's doctrinal best firing range range*/
public int bestFiringRange = 20;
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/** This is this side's communications range*/
public int commRange = 60;
/** This is a range at which other agents become noticable or threatening*/
public int thresholdRange = 30;
/** The force ratio advantage an agent needs before attacking*/
public int ratio2Attack = 1;
/** The force ratio needed to stop attacking and advance to goal*/
public int ratio20verrun = 3;
/** The minimum unit size an agent needs to advance toward goal*/
public int min2Advance = 1;
/** The minimum number of nearby friendlies needed before the agent no longer tries to regroup*/
public int minUnitSize = 1;
/** The distance the agent tries to stay away from the enemy*/
public int minDist2Enemy = 7;
/** The shoulder spacing of a unit*/
public int minDist2Friendly = 5;
/** The min distance an agent tries to stay away from his base*/
public int minDist2Base = 20;
/** The number of rounds available to the agent*/
public int ammo = 10;
/** The normal distance an agent will move in one turn */
public int cruiseSpeed = 15;
// class wide variables
/** An iteration counter*/
int j = 0;
/** The number of enemy in sensor range*/
int enemyStrength;
/** The number of enemy within the threshold range*/
int threatStrength;
/** The number of friendlies in sensor or comm range*/
int friendlyStrength;
/** The number of friendlies within the threshold range*/
int unitStrength;
/** A variable used to scale the effects of personality factors*/
int divisor;
/** A variable used to scale the effects of personality factors*/
int divsr;
/** A switch that gives an agent "armor" if defending his base*/
public int preparedDefense = 0;
// Vectors of information maintained by the agent (his short term memory) /** The vector of type observation from agents in sensor range*/
public Vector observedAgents;
/** The vector of type observation from agents that threaten this agent*/
public Vector myThreat;
// Boolean state indicators
/** A switch indicating agent is alive*/
public boolean alive = true;
/** This indicates the simulation has not hit the time limit*/
public boolean notDone = true;
/** This indicates the agent has fired his weapon*/
public boolean takeShot = false;
/** This indicates the agent has hit his target*/
public boolean hitTarget = false;
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/** This indicates the agent has reached the enemy base*/
public boolean madeGoal = false;
/** A switch indicating conditions favorable for attacking*/
public boolean attack = false;
/** A switch indicating conditions favorable for advancing*/
public boolean advance = false;
/** A switch indicating conditions favorable for regrouping*/
public boolean regroup = false;
/** A switch indicating conditions favorable for defending*/
public boolean defend = false;
// CONSTRUCTORS $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
//$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
/** This is the default constructor used for logic tests and simple (1 v 1) cases.
most parameters to be "hardwired" within the TAgent class code.

It requires

*/
public TAgent(int t){
xnew = 200 + 50*(2*t - 1);
ynew = 150 + 50*(2*t - 1);■
type = t;
id = t;
AssignColor(t);
}
/** This is the constructor to be used in most cases. It allows for preset personality traits
constructed in the TAgentAttributes class to be used. The integer "i" is this agents position in
Manager's 'v' vector.
"t" is the type or side of this agent.
"s" is the squad size or
number of agents per row in the initial formation.
"e" is the initial number of enemy agents.
"A" is the personality this agent will have.
*/
public TAgent(int i, int t, int s, int e, TAgentAttributes A){
id = i;
type = t;
// s is squad size, a parameter defining the shape of the initial formation
// e is the starting number of enemy
int p; //this adjusts an assymetric force with ghost agents to make it symetric for
initialization.
if (i<=(2*(e-l))+t){p = i;}
else {p = (((i - (2*e))*2) + t +(2*e)),-}
int squad = (int)Math.floor(p/(2*s));
xnew = 200 + (100*(2*t - 1) + 3*(p-(s*squad*2))*(-2*t + 1));
ynew = 150 + (100*(2*t - 1) + (6*squad)*(-2*t + 1));
loadAttributes(A);
AssignColor(t);
if (type ==
goalx =
goalY =
baseX =
baseY =
}

0) {
Executive.redBaseX;
Executive.redBaseY;
Executive.blueBaseX;
Executive.blueBaseY;

if (type ==
goalx =
goalY =
baseX =
baseY =
}

1) {
Executive.blueBaseX;
Executive. blueBaseY,Executive.redBaseX;
Executive.redBaseY;

}
// METHODS

$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

// $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
/** The run() method is the main execution loop for the TAgent thread. It will call all major
sub-methods. Specifically, this is the TAgent's OODA loop. I have set decide)) as a
synchronized method to deconflict the multithreading sleep processes as suggested by Kevin Healy
of Threadtech. Earlier attempts without the synchronization turned into multithreaded knots of
confusion. This does impair the free flow concept of multithreaded agents somewhat, but working
code is happy code.
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public void run ( ) {
while (notDone && alive){
observe( );
orient( );
decide( );
try { sleep(sleepTime);
}
catch (InterruptedException e){)
act( ),if (notDone == false){stop();}
}

} // end run() ==========================
/** This is the agents observe portion of the OODA loop. Here the agent scans to see all the
other agents within sensor range. The agent collects the information in the form of a vector of
type observation called observedAgents.

*/
public void observe) ){
observedAgents = new Vector) ); //This is the TAgent's short term memory of all agents
within sensor range
// Reset the following variables
enemyStrength = 0;
threatStrength = 0;
friendlyStrength = 1;
unitStrength = 1;
myFriendsX = 0 ;
myFriendsY = 0;
// The program finds the range to all other TAgents
for (int i =0,-i < Executive.VP.v.size () ; i++) {
TAgent pilot;
pilot = (TAgent)Executive.VP.v.elementAt(i) ;
double range;
range = getDistance(pilot);
// If an enemy agent is within range, he is observed
if (pilot.id ! = id && pilot.alive == true) {
if (range <= sensorRange && pilot.type != type){
observation bogey = new observation(pilot);
bogey.setRange(range);
observedAgents.addElement(bogey);
enemyStrength ++;
if (range <= thresholdRange) {
threatStrength ++;
}
}
// If an friendly agent is within range, he is observed
if (pilot.type == type) {
if (range <= sensorRange || range <= commRange) {
observation bogey = new observation(pilot);
bogey.setRange(range);
observedAgents.addElement(bogey);
friendlyStrength ++;
myFriendsX += bogey.hisX;
myFriendsY += bogey.hisY;
if (range <= thresholdRange)
unitStrength ++;
}

{

}
}
}
}
} // end observe =================================

=

/** The orient portion of the OODA loop computes the center of mass for
observed enemy and friendly forces and prioritizes threates by position.
It also sets logic switches for possible courses of action.

*/
public void orient( ){
// reset the variables
attack = false;
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=

advance = false;
regroup = false;
observation temp = new observation();
observation EWO = new observation();
myThreatX = 0;
myThreatY = 0;
divisor = 0;
/** Sort the observed enemy by range and keep track of highest threats (closest)*/
int perceivedThreat;
if (threatStrength < SA) {perceivedThreat = threatStrength;}
else perceivedThreat = SA;
/** Put the highest threat enemies into the vector myThreat (short term memory)*/
myThreat = new Vector(perceivedThreat);
for (int i=0; i<perceivedThreat; i++) {
temp.setRange(sensorRange +1) ;
for (int k=0; k < observedAgents.size(); k++) {
EWO = (observation)observedAgents.elementAt(k);
if (EWO. team '.= type && EWO.range < temp.range) {
temp = EWO;
}
}
myThreat.insertElementAt(temp, i);
/** This will compute the center of mass of the threat */
myThreatX = myThreatX + EWO.hisX;
myThreatY = myThreatY + EWO.hisY;
}
/** This will tell the agent his unit is undermanned to do the job and they should regroup*/
if (unitStrength <= minUnitSize && friendlyStrength >= unitStrength) {
regroup = true;
divisor += IRegroup;
}
else {regroup = false;}
/** This checks to see if the agent's unit is doctrinally large enough to advance */
if (unitStrength >= min2Advance || friendlyStrength ==1) {
advance = true;
divisor += IAdvance;
}
else {advance = false;}
/** This checks the force ratio to see if the agent should attack */
if (threatStrength != 0) {
if ((unitStrength/threatStrength) >= ratio2Attack) {
attack = true;
divisor += IAttack;
}
else {
attack = false;
if (regroup == false){
regroup = true;
divisor += IRegroup;
}
}
if ((unitStrength/threatStrength) >= ratio20verrun) {
attack = false;
divisor - = IAttack;
if (advance == false){
advance = true;
divisor += IAdvance;
}
}
}
/** This will call all friendlies in commRange of base to defend the base if its threatened*/
if ( getDistance2Base(this) <= commRange ) {
defend = false;
for (int i=0; i < Executive.VP.v.size(); i++) {
TAgent pilot;
pilot = (TAgent)Executive.VP.v.elementAt(i);
if (pilot.type != type){
double range;
range = getDistance2Base(pilot);
if (range < sensorRange){
defend = true;
divisor += IDefend;
}
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}
}
}

else {
defend = false;
preparedDefense = 0;
}
/** This computes the center of mass (or CG, center of gravity) for the threat
if (myThreat.size0 > 0) {
myThreatCgX = Math.round(myThreatX/myThreat.size());
myThreatCgY = Math.round(myThreatY/myThreat.size());
}

*/

/** This computes the center of mass (CG) for the friendlies in comm/sensor range */
if (friendlyStrength > 1) {
myFriendsCgX = Math.round(myFriendsX/(friendlyStrength-1));
myFriendsCgY = Math.round(myFriendsY/(friendlyStrength-1));
}
//System.out.println( "TAgent " + id + " orients " );
//System.out.println( id +"'s attack is " + attack + " and regroup is " + regroup);
} // end orient ================================================================
/** The decide part of the OODA loop picks a course of action for the agent. It decides where
the agent should move and whether or not the agent should engage the enemy. This is the
synchronized method so only one agent at a time can decide a course of action. The thread is put
to sleep after this method to simulate the time required to complete the decision cycle including
physically executing the decision the agent makes here.

*/
synchronized void decide( ){
//

First, re-initialize the variables that will be calculated
deltaX = 0;
deltaY = .0;

//

Next the agent calculates his best move
if (advance == true) { // Move toward goal
if (xnew < goalX){deltaX += (Math.min((cruiseSpeed),(goalX-xnew)))*IAdvance;}
else {deltaX -= (Math.min((cruiseSpeed),(xnew-goalX)))*IAdvance;}
if (ynew < goalY){deltaY += (Math.min((cruiseSpeed),(goalY-ynew)))*IAdvance;}
else {deltaY -= (Math.min((cruiseSpeed),(ynew-goalY)))*IAdvance;}
}
if (defend == true) { // Move toward base
if (xnew < baseX){deltaX += (Math.min((cruiseSpeed),(baseX - xnew)))*IDefend;}
else {deltaX -= (Math.min((cruiseSpeed),(xnew-baseX)))*IDefend;}
if (ynew < baseY){deltaY += (Math.min((cruiseSpeed),(baseY - ynew)))*IDefend;}
else {deltaY -= (Math.min((cruiseSpeed),(ynew - baseY)))*IDefend;}
preparedDefense ++;
if(preparedDefense < 3){health ++;} // simulates an advantage for a prepared defense
}

if (attack == true) { // move to enemy eg wrt min range to enemy & friendly
int distX = Math.abs (myThreatX - baseX) ,int distY = Math.abs(myThreatY - baseY);
double scale = bestFiringRange/Math.max(l,getDistance(myThreatCgX, myThreatCgY,
baseX, baseY));
int dx = Math.round(distX * (float)scale);
int dy = Math.round(distY * (float)scale);
if (myThreatCgX < baseX){
if(xnew < myThreatCgX+dx){deltaX+=(Math.min(cruiseSpeed,(myThreatCgX+dx)xnew))*IAttack;}
else{deltaX +=(Math.min(cruiseSpeed, xnew-(myThreatCgX+dx)))*IAttack; }
}
else {
if(xnew < myThreatCgX-dx){deltaX+=(Math.min(cruiseSpeed,(myThreatCgX-dx)xnew))*IAttack;}
else{deltaX +=(Math.min(cruiseSpeed,xnew-(myThreatCgX-dx)))*IAttack; }
}
if (myThreatCgY < baseY){
if(ynew < myThreatCgY+dy){deltaY+=(Math.min(cruiseSpeed,(myThreatCgY+dy)ynew))*IAttack;}
else{deltaY +=(Math.min(cruiseSpeed, ynew-(myThreatCgY+dy)))*IAttack; }
}
else {
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if(ynew < myThreatCgY-dy){deltaY+=(Math.mintcruiseSpeed,(myThreatCgY-dy)ynew))»IAttack;}

else{deltaY +=(Math.min(cruiseSpeed,ynew-(myThreatCgY-dy)))*IAttack; }

}
}
if (regroup == true) { // Move toward friendly eg wrt min range to enemy & friendly
if (xnew < myFriendsCgX){
deltaX += (Math.min((cruiseSpeed),myFriendsCgX))*IRegroup;
else {deltaX -= (Math.mint(cruiseSpeed),myFriendsCgX))*IRegroup;}
if (ynew < myFriendsCgY){
deltaY += (Math.min((cruiseSpeed),myFriendsCgX))*IRegroup;
else {deltaY -= (Math.mint(cruiseSpeed),myFriendsCgX))*IRegroup;}
}
/** Normalize the agent's movement based on his personality */
if (divisor != 0) {
if (Math.abs(deltaX/divisor) < 1 &S= deltaX != 0)
if ((deltaX/divisor)>0){deltaX = 1;}
else {deltaX = -1;}
}
else {deltaX = Math.round(deltaX/divisor);}
if (Math.abs(deltaY/divisor) < 1 && deltaY != 0)
if ((deltaY/divisor)>0){deltaY = 1;}
else {deltaY = -1;}
}
else {deltaY = Math.round(deltaY/divisor);}

{

{

}
/**

This will limit the distance moved in one step to "maxSpeed" */
if (deltaX >= deltaY) {
if (deltaX > maxSpeed){
deltaY = maxSpeed*(deltaY/deltaX);
deltaX = maxSpeed;
}
if (deltaX < -maxSpeed){
deltaY = -maxSpeed*(deltaY/deltaX);
deltaX = -maxSpeed;
}
}
if (deltaX < deltaY) {
if (deltaY > maxSpeed){
deltaX = maxSpeed*(deltaX/deltaY);
deltaY = maxSpeed;
}
if (deltaY < -maxSpeed){
deltaX = -maxSpeed*(deltaX/deltaY);
deltaY = -maxSpeed;
}
}

//

This will keep the
if (deltaX
if (deltaX
if (deltaY
if (deltaY

agents
+ xnew
+ xnew
+ ynew
+ ynew

from running off the edge of the visible battlefield
>= 395){deltaX = 395 - xnew;}
<= 5){deltaX = xnew - 5;}
>= 295){deltaY = 295 - ynew;}
<= 5){deltaY = ynew - 5;}

//

This will stop the agent at the goal when he gets there
if (xnew == goalX && myThreat.size()==0){deltaX = 0;
}
if (ynew == goalY && myThreat.size 0==0){deltaY = 0;

//

This will park the agent at the top or bottom of the screen when he reaches his goal
if ((getDistance2Goal(this) <= 3) && myThreat.sized ==0) {
deltaX = 0;
deltaY = 0;
xnew = 200 - ((150-5*id)*(2*type - 1));
ynew = 150 - 145*(2*type - 1);
goalX = xnew;
goalY = ynew;
outColor = Color.white;
madeGoal = true;

//

This will adjust the new normalized position to keep desired distance from base
int min2Base = 3;
if (defend == false) {min2Base = minDist2Base;}
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if (getDistance2Base(this) <= min2Base) {
if ((xnew - baseX) > 0) {delX += (min2Base - (xnew - baseX))*IAvoidBase;}
else {delX -= (min2Base - (baseX - xnew))*IAvoidBase;}
if ((ynew - baseY) > 0) {delY += (min2Base - (ynew - baseY))*IAvoidBase;}
else {delY -= (min2Base - (baseY - ynew))*IAvoidBase;}
divsr += IAvoidBase;
}
} // end decide ==========
/** The act method simply executes the decision made before the thread's sleep cycle.
First, the agent moves into his selected position, then he fires at his greatest threats
based on the information (threat location) gathered in the observe method.

*/
public void act( ){
/* This will adjust the TAgent's next position for restrictions on being too close to others
that may have moved while he slept */
int myNextX = (int)deltaX + xnew;
int myNextY = (int)deltaY + ynew;
delX = 0;
delY = 0;
int divsr = 0;
int min2Enemy = 5;
int min2Friendly = 5;
if (observedAgents.size()>0) {
for (int s = 0; s < observedAgents.size(); s++){
observation pilot;
TAgent copilot;
pilot =(observation)observedAgents.elementAt(s);
copilot = (TAgent)Executive.VP.v.elementAt(pilot.index);
double nextRange = getDistance(copilot);
if (attack == false){min2Enemy = minDist2Enemy;}
if ((copilot.type != type) && (nextRange <= min2Enemy) && (copilot.alive ==
true))

{
if ((myNextX-copilot.xnew)>0){
delX += (min2Enemy - (myNextX - copilot.xnew))*IAvoidEnemy;
}
else {delX -= (min2Enemy - (copilot.xnew - myNextX))*IAvoidEnemy;}
if ((myNextY-copilot.ynew)>0){
delY += (min2Enemy - (myNextY - copilot.ynew))*IAvoidEnemy;
}
else {delY -= (min2Enemy - (copilot.ynew - myNextY))*IAvoidEnemy;}
divsr += IAvoidEnemy;
}
if (regroup == false) {min2Friendly = minDist2Friendly;}
if (getDistance(myNextX, myNextY, goalX, goalY) < 5) {min2Friendly = 1;}

if ( (copilot. type==type)&&(nextRange<=min2Friendly)&;& (copilot. madeGoal==false) ) {
if ((myNextX-copilot.xnew)>0){
delX += (min2Friendly - (myNextX - copilot.xnew))»IAvoidFriendlies;
}
else {delX -= (min2Friendly - (copilot.xnew myNextX))*IAvoidFriendlies;}
if ((myNextY-copilot.ynew)>0){
delY += (min2Friendly - (myNextY - copilot.ynew))*IAvoidFriendlies;
}
else {delY -= (min2Friendly - (copilot.ynew myNextY))*IAvoidFriendlies;}
divsr += IAvoidFriendlies;
}
}
}
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if (divsr != 0) {
if (Math.abs(delX/divsr) < 1 &S= delX != 0)
if ((delX/divsr)>0){delX = 1;}
else {delX = -1;}
}
else {delX = Math.round(delx/divsr);}
if (Math.abs(delY/divsr) < 1 &S= delY != 0)
if ((delY/divsr)>0){delY = 1;}
else {delY = -1;}
}
else {delY = Math.round(delY/divsr);}

{

{

}
//

This will keep the
if (delX +
if (delX +
if (delY +
if (delY +

agents from running off the edge of the visible battlefield
myNextX >= 395){delX = 395 - myNextX;}
myNextX <= 5){delX = myNextX - 5;}
myNextY >= 295){delY = 295 - myNextY;}
myNextY <= 5){delY = myNextY - 5;}

if (alive == true){
/* This is needed to keep from acting if the agant was killed while the thread slept

/

xold = xnew;
yold = ynew;
xnew = xnew + (int)deltaX + (int)delX;
ynew = ynew + (int)deltaY + (int)delY;
Executive.field.repaint) ); // *** repaint the screen
for (int s = 0; s < myThreat.size(); s++){
observation navigator;
navigator =(observation)myThreat.elementAt(s);
if (navigator.range<weaponsRange && ammo>0 && navigator.isAlive==true){
targetX = navigator. hisX;
targetY = navigator.hisY;
takeShot = true;
ammo--;
shoot(navigator.index);
Executive.field.repaint) ); // *** repaint the screen
takeShot = false;
hitTarget = false;

// reset these switches for the next iteration

}
}
} // end act()
//

LESSOR METHODS SSSS$S$$$$$$$$S$S$SS$SS$SSS$$$S$SSS$$$SSSS$S$$$$S$$SSS$$SSS$$$SSSSSSSSS$$$

// $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$s$$$$$$$$$$$s$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
/** This method assigns the appropriate color to each side */
public void AssignColor (int n){
if (n == 0) {
inColor = Color.blue;
outColor = Color.blue;
}
else if (n == 1) {
inColor = Color.red;
outColor = Color.red;
}
else {
inColor = Color.green;
outColor = Color.green;
}
} // End sleep ========================
=
/** This method draws the agent and tracer fire on the screen */
public void Draw(Graphics g){
g.setColor(outColor);
g.drawOval(xnew-2, ynew-2, 4, 4);
if (takeShot == true && alive == true) {
g.drawLine(xnew, ynew, targetX, targetY);
}
if (hitTarget == true) {
g.drawOval(targetX-3, targetY-3, 6, 6);
}

g.setColor(inColor);
g.fillOval(xnew-2, ynew-2, 4, 4);
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====

int b = Executive.baseSize;
g.setColor(Color.blue);
g.fillRect(Executive.blueBaseX, Executive.blueBaseY, b, b) ,g.setColor(Color.red);
g.fillRect(Executive.redBaseX-b, Executive.redBaseY-b,b,b);

}

// End of Draw

/** This calculates the range to another agent */
public double getDistance(TAgent t) {
double squareDistance;
squareDistance = (xnew - t.xnew)*(xnew - t.xnew)+(ynew - t.ynew)*(ynew - t.ynew);
return Math.sqrt(squareDistance);
:
} // end getDistance (TAgent)==================================================
/** This calculates the distance between any two cartesian coordinates */
public double getDistance(int x, int y, int X, int Y) {
double squareDistance;
squareDistance = (x - X)*(x - X)+(y - Y)*(y - Y);
return Math.sqrt(squareDistance);
} // end getDistance (int,int,int,int)=====================================

:

/** This finds the distance an agent is from his base */
public double getDistance2Base(TAgent t) {
double squareDistance;
squareDistance = (baseX - t.xnew)*(baseX - t.xnew)+(baseY - t.ynew)*(baseY - t.ynew);
return Math.sqrt(squareDistance);
} // end getDistance2Base ===============================================
/** This finds the distance an agent is from his goal */
public double getDistance2Goal(TAgent t) {
double squareDistance;
squareDistance = (goalX - t.xnew)*(goalX - t.xnew)+(goalY - t.ynew)*(goalY - t.ynew);
return Math.sqrt(squareDistance);
} // end getDistance2Goal =====================================================
/** This method shoots at target coordinates. The shot is penalized by distance. A
hit is determined by a stochastic random number draw against the probability of hit (Pk) */
public void shoot(int id){
TAgent victim;
double targetRange;
victim = ((TAgent)Executive.VP.v.elementAt(id));
if (victim.xnew==targetX && victim.ynew==targetY) {//can hit only if TGT doesn't move)
targetRange = getDistance(victim);
if (type == 0){Executive.VP.totalBlueShots++;}
else {Executive.VP.totalRedShots++;}
(Executive.getRandom()<(pk*(bestFiringRange/Math.max(bestFiringRange,targetRange)))
victim.gotShot();
hitTarget = true;
if (type == 0) {Executive.VP.totalBlueHits ++;}
else {Executive.VP.totalRedHits ++;}
}
}
} // end shoot ===============================
=

){

/** This method decrements the agent's health if he gets shot and puts him in
the morgue if he dies */
public void gotShot(){
health—;
if (health == 0){
alive = false;
xnew = 200 + 195*(2*type - 1);
//This puts the dead agent on the side of the field
ynew = 150 + (100 - 5*id)*(2*type - 1); //This adjusts vertical position of the dead
if (type == 0) {inColor = Color.cyan;} // This makes the dead pale in color
else if (type == 1) {inColor = Color.pink;}
}
====================
/** This method is called by the constructor and will load personality and doctrinal attributes
from an object of type TAgentAttributes into a newly created agent */
public void loadAttributes(TAgentAttributes A){
sleepTime = A.sleepTime;
health = A.health;
pk = A.pk;
SA = A.SA;
maxSpeed = A.maxSpeed ;
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IAdvance = A.IAdvance;
IAttack = A.IAttack;
IRegroup = A.IRegroup;
IDefend = A.IDefend ;
IAvoidEnemy = A.IAvoidEnemy;
lAvoidFriendlies = A.IAvoidFriendlies;
IAvoidBase = A.IAvoidBase;
sensorRange = A.sensorRange;
weaponsRange = A.weaponsRange;
bestFiringRange = A.bestFiringRange;
commRange = A.commRange;
thresholdRange = A.thresholdRange;
ratio2Attack = A.ratio2Attack;
ratio20verrun = A.ratio20verrun;
min2Advance = A.min2Advance;
minUnitSize = A.minUnitSize;
minDist2Enemy = A.minDist2Enemy;
minDist2Friendly = A.minDist2Friendly;
minDist2Base = A.minDist2Base;
ammo = A.ammo;
cruiseSpeed = A.cruiseSpeed;
// end loadAttributes===================
}// end of TAgent mrnrninrninirarrauimuriiimimminnrauiraiirirnrriiim^
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Source code for TAgentAttributes class
/*

Major Tom Tighe's Air Force Institute of Technology Thesis Project
last revised on 29 Jan 1999

*/
import j ava.awt.*;
import java.lang.*;
/**This class should contain most of the parameters needed
to build a TAgent with the exception of the index, the side,
and the initial position. In other words this class will hold
the personalities of the agents and should help keep the Executive,
Manager, and TAgent initialization cleaner and easier. */
public class TAgentAttributes {
//VARIABLES $$?$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$«$$$$««$$$$$$$$$$$$$
// These are individual personality traits: ======
/**

The length of delay in the decision cycle*/
public int sleepTime = 200;

/**

How many hits until this agent dies*/
public int health = 1;

/**

The single shot probability of kill at best range*/
public double pk = .5;

/** The max number of enemy of which the agent can keep aware */
public int SA = 1;
/** The largest step an agent can take in one turn*/
public int maxSpeed = 20;
/** The personality weight or desire to advance to goal */
public int IAdvance = 2;
/** The personality weight or desire to attack if favorable force ratio*/
public int IAttack = 10;
/** The personality weight or desire to regroup if unit gets too small*/
public int IRegroup = 5;
/** The personality weight or desire to defend base if called */
public int IDefend = 7;
/**

The personality weight or desire to avoid enemy if not attacking*/
public int IAvoidEnemy = 2;

/** The personality weight or desire to maintain spacing if unit size is OK */
public int IAvoidFriendlies = 2;
/** The personality weight or desire to avoid base if not under attack */
public int IAvoidBase = 2;
// These are doctrinal standards: =============

=

=

=

=-

/** This is this side's visual or sensor range*/
public int sensorRange =70;
/** This is this side's max weapons range*/
public int weaponsRange = 60;
/** This is this side's doctrinal best firing range range*/
public int bestFiringRange = 40;
/** This is this side's communications range*/
public int commRange = 80;
/** This is a range at which other agents become noticable or threatening*/
public int thresholdRange = 40;
/** The force ratio advantage an agent needs before attacking*/
public int ratio2Attack = 1;
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/** The force ratio needed to stop attacking and advance to goal*/
public int ratio20verrun = 3;
/** The minimum unit size an agent needs to advance toward goal*/
public int min2Advance = 2;
/** The minimum number of nearby friendlies needed before the agent no longer tries to regroup*/
public int minUnitSize = 3;
/** The distance the agent tries to stay away from the enemy*/
public int minDist2Enemy = 30;
/** The shoulder spacing of a unit*/
public int minDist2Friendly = 20;
/** The min distance an agent tries to stay away from his base*/
public int minDist2Base = 30;
/** The number of rounds available to the agent*/
public int ammo = 100;
/** The normal distance an agent will move in one turn */
public int cruiseSpeed = 15;

//CONSTRUCTORS $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$5$
/** This is the default constructor. It accepts the default value for each variable */
public TAgentAttributes(){} // end of default constructor ====================
/** This constructor contains many predefined personalities or sets of attributes. Any number of
personalities can be built and stored here. This is especially useful in multiple case
comparison runs when an integer iteration counter can be used to step through many of the
predefined personalities. The integer argument "i" is the label given to a personality defined
in this constructor.

*/
public TAgentAttributes(int i){
if (i == 0){
// This is the baseline personality
sleepTime = 200;
maxSpeed = 20;
}
else if (i ==
sleepTime
}
else if (i ==
sleepTime
}
else if (i ==
sleepTime
}
else if (i ==
sleepTime
}
else if (i ==
sleepTime
}
else if (i ==
sleepTime
}
else if (i ==
sleepTime
}
else if (i ==
sleepTime
}
else if (i ==
sleepTime
}
else if (i ==
sleepTime
}
else if (i ==
sleepTime
}
else if (i ==
sleepTime

1){
= 200;
2){
= 250;
3) {
= 300;
4){
= 350;
5){
= 400;
6){
= 450;
7){
= 500;
8) {
= 550;
9) {
= 600;
10) {
= 650;
11){
= 700;
12) {
= 750;
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}

else if (i == 13){
sleepTime = 800;
}
else if (i == 14){
sleepTime = 850;
}
else if (i == 15) {
sleepTime = 900;
}
else if (i == 16){
sleepTime = 950;
}
else if (i == 17){
sleepTime = 1000;
}
else {
System.out.println("Please select a TAgentAtttribute between 0 and 17")
}
if (i!=0){
//
maxSpeed = sleepTime/10;
//
cruiseSpeed = (int)Math.round(.75*maxSpeed);
//
pk = 1.0;
}
}// end of constructor with argument (int i)=======================

/** This constructor is to be used to adjust sleepTime from user input without having to build a
predefined personality. The float value "f" most be between 0 and 5.0 and will be the sleep time
or OODA delay in seconds.

*/
public TAgentAttributes(float f){
if ( (f > 0) && (f < 5000)){
sleepTime = Math.round(f*1000);
//
maxSpeed = Math.round(f*100);
//
cruiseSpeed = (int(Math.round(.75*maxSpeed);
}
else{
System.out.println("Please reinitialize with a OODA delay between 0 and 5.
base line is 0.2");
}
}//End of constructor with float argument ==================================—
//

\nThe

METHODS $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$

/** This can be used to set the variable "sleepTime" in the TAgentAttribute */
public void setSleepTime(int s)
{ sleepTime = s;}
/** This can be used to set the variable "sensorRange" in the TAgentAttribute */
public void setSensorRange(int o)
{ sensorRange = o;}
/** This method will return the value of the variable "sleepTime" in the TAgentAttribute */
public int getSleepTime()
{ return sleepTime;}
/** This method will return the value of the variable "sensorRange" in the TAgentAttribute */
public int getSensorRange()
{ return sensorRange;}
} // end of TAgentAttributes

mmiirararamimrrmimmmiraraimmrnrrmmimitiininmmm^
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Source code for Observation class
// Major Tom Tighe's Air Force Institute of Technology Thesis Project

//
// last revised on 06 Jan 1999
import j ava.awt. *;
/** This class is used to store relevent information about agents that have
been observed. This information is used by the TAgent in decisions about posture
and movement.

*/
public class observation {
//VARIABLES $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$S$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$S$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$SS$$$$$$$$$$$$$
/** This is the range from this agent to the observed agent*/
public double range;
/** This is the observed agents id or position in the vector of agents in the Manager*/
public int index;
/** This is the type of the observed agent*/
public int team;
/** This is the x coordinate of the observed agent*/
public int hisX;
/** This is the y coordinate of the observed agent*/
public int hisY;
/** This indicated if the observed agent is alive*/
public boolean isAlive;
/** Indicates the observed agent has reached the enemy base*/
public boolean hasMadeGoal;
//CONSTRUCTORS $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
/** This is the default constructor. All variable values are set to zero or false */
public observation;){
index = 0;
team = 0;
hisX = 0;
hisY = 0;
range = 0;
isAlive = false;
hasMadeGoal = false;
} // End of default constructor ==============================================
/** This constructor makes an observation of the TAgent passed to it*/
public observation(TAgent t){
index = t.id;
team = t.type;
hisX = t.xnew;
hisY = t.ynew;
range = 0;
isAlive = t.alive;
hasMadeGoal = t.madeGoal;
}// End of constructor ========================================================
// METHODS $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
// I built these methods, but only used setRange() in my thesis project.

/**

*/

public void setlndex(int i)

{

index = i;}

/** This can be used to set the variable "team" in the observation */
public void setTeam(int t)
{ team = t; }
/** This can be used to set the variable "hisX" in the observation */
public void setHisX(int x)
{ hisX = x;}
/** This can be used to set the variable "hisY" in the observation */
public void setHisY(int y)
{ hisY = y;}
/** This can be used to set the variable "range" in the observation */
public void setRange(double r)
{ range = r;}
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/** This method will return the value of the variable "index" in the observation */
public int getlndexO
{ return index;}
/** This method will return the value of the variable "team" in the observation */
public int getTeamO
{ return team;}
/** This method will return the value of the variable "hisX" in the observation */
public int getHisXO
{ return hisX;}
/** This method will return the value of the variable "hisY" in the observation */
public int getHisYO
{ return hisY;}
/** This method will return the value of the variable "range" in the observation */
public double getRangeO
{ return range;}

} // End of observation

nramimmmmirrarararaiiiraimmmmnrarararammmmm^
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Source code for DataPoint class
// Major Tom Tighe's Air Force Institute of Technology Thesis Project

//
// last revised on 21 Jan 1999
import java.awt.*;
/** The dataPoint class is used to gather and hold sample data. It
currently keeps track of the number of agents still alive and those
at their goal in the simulation at the time dataPoint is called

*/
public class dataPoint {
//VARIABLES $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
/** The number of alive agents of type 0 (blue) */
static int blueAlive = 0;
/** The number of alive agents of type 1 (red) */
static int redAlive = 0;
/** The number of agents of type 0 (blue) that have reached their goal */
static int blueAtGoal = 0;
/** The number of agents of type 1 (red) that have reached their goal */
static int redAtGoal = 0;
// CONSTRUCTORS $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
/** This class only has a default constructor */
public dataPoint(){}
// METHODS $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
/** This method loads the data about one agent into the dataPoint object.
This method will normally be called iteratively to sample all the agents controlled
by the current Manager. This method is called from within Manager.

*/
static void addData(TAgent t){
if (t.type == 0){
if (t.alive == true) {blueAlive++;}
if (t.madeGoal == true) {blueAtGoal++;}
}
if (t.type == 1){
if (t.alive == true) {redAlive++;}
if (t.madeGoal == true) {redAtGoal++;}
}
/** The number of alive agents of type 0 (blue) */
} //end of addData() =========================================================
/** This method resets all the values help in the dataPoint to zero */
public void zero()(
blueAlive = 0;
redAlive = 0;
blueAtGoal = 0;
redAtGoal = 0;
}// End of zeroO ============================================================
} // end of dataPoint

mmmiimmmiiranmmmmmmmmmmimTimmiii^^
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